# 1NC

### FW

#### Our Framework:

#### The only reason to vote Affirmative must be based on the hypothetical enactment of a topical plan

#### We have definitional support:

#### The topic is defined by the phrase following the colon – the USFG is the agent of the resolution, not individual debaters

Websters, 2000 (Guide to Grammar and Writing, http://ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/marks/colon.htm)

Use of a colon before a list or an explanation that is preceded by a clause that can stand by itself. Think of the colon as a gate, inviting one to go on… If the introductory phrase preceding the colon is very brief and the clause following the colon represents the real business of the sentence, begin the clause after the colon with a capital letter.

#### And – Resolved expresses intent to implement the plan

American Heritage Dictionary, 2000 (www.dictionary.com/cgi-bin/dict.pl?term=resolved)

To find a solution to; solve …

To bring to a usually successful conclusion

#### And – the USFG is the government in Washington, D.C.

Encarta, 2000 (Online Encyclopedia, http://encarta.msn.com)

The federal government of the United States is centered in Washington DC.

#### Prefer our framework:

#### First – Fairness – Defending the enactment of the plan by the government is the starting point for all negative ground. Non-policy frameworks collapse predictability and do not have balanced lit bases

#### Second – Clash – Non-policy frameworks regress infinitely, which kills preparation and minimizes education

#### And – Unlimited advocacy collapses into conservatism – our attempt to limit the discussion in a fair way enables productive political contestation and true revolutionary advocacies. Refusal to exclude anything means their framework is self-defeating

Shively, 2000 (Ruth Lessl, Former Assistant Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, Political Theory and Partisan Politics, p. 180-181)

'Thus far, I have argued that if the ambiguists mean to be subversive about anything, they need to be conservative about some things. They need to be steadfast supporters of the structures of openness and democracy: willing to say "no" to certain forms of contest; willing to set up certain clear limitations about acceptable behavior. To this, finally, I would add that if the ambiguists mean to stretch the bound¬aries of behavior—if they want to be revolutionary and disruptive in their skepticism and iconoclasm—they need first to be firm believers in something. Which is to say, again, they need to set clear limits about what they will and will not support, what they do and do not believe to be best. As G. K. Chesterton observed, the true revolutionary has always willed something "definite and limited." For example, "The Jacobin could tell you not only the system he would rebel against, but (what was more important) the system he would not rebel against..." He "desired the freedoms of democracy." He "wished to have votes and not to have titles . . ." But "because the new rebel is a skeptic"—be¬cause he cannot bring himself to will something definite and limited— "he cannot be a revolutionary." For "the fact that he wants to doubt everything really gets in his way when he wants to denounce any¬thing" (Chesterton 1959,41). Thus, the most radical skepticism ends in the most radical conservatism. In other words, a refusal to judge among ideas and activities is, in the end, an endorsement of the status quo. To embrace everything is to be unable to embrace a particular plan of action, for to embrace a particular plan of action is to reject all others, at least for that moment. Moreover, as observed in our discussion of openness, to embrace everything is to embrace self-contradiction: to hold to both one's purposes and to that which defeats one's purposes—to tolerance and intolerance, open-mindedness and close-mindedness, democracy and tyranny. In the same manner, then, the ambiguists' refusals to will some¬thing "definite and limited" undermines their revolutionary impulses. In their refusal to say what they will not celebrate and what they will not rebel against, they deny themselves (and everyone else in their political world) a particular plan or ground to work from. By refusing to deny incivility, they deny themselves a civil public space from which to speak. They cannot say "no" to the terrorist who would silence dissent. They cannot turn their backs on the bullying of the white supremacist. And, as such, in refusing to bar the tactics of the anti-democrat, they refuse to support the tactics of the democrat. In short, then, to be a true ambiguist, there must be some limit to what is ambiguous. To fully support political contest, one must fully support some uncontested rules and reasons. To generally reject the silencing or exclusion of others, one must sometimes silence or exclude those who reject civility and democracy.

#### And – Their framework’s exclusive, moralizing presupposition that they have to be outside of the state prevents self-reflexivity and results in the total breakdown of dialogue and engagement

Keenan, 1998 (Alan, Ph.D., Member of the Committee on Degrees in Social Studies at Harvard University, Theory and Event, Vol. 2 No. 1, http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/journals/theory\_and\_event/v002/2.1keenan.html)

The anti-political nature of guilt, in turn, helps explain the political failures of left "moralism" and its particular mode of politicization. By "moralism," I mean that form of discourse that speaks, acts, and calls others to act, from a presumed, or desired, position of moral and political purity and unquestionable correctness. 39 While not always explicitly grounding its political appeals in the language of guilt and innocence, moralism nonetheless amounts to the project of regulating personal and collective behavior according a preexisting code of right and wrong, the existence of which assures the possibility of correct behavior and decisions, the aim being to map behavior onto code without any excess or remainder. The most obvious and publicized examples of left moralism would be codes of speech and behavior, both explicit and implicit, concerned with issues of race, gender, sexuality, and other "sensitive" concerns, yet the animating moralistic attitude goes beyond any particular set of issues, and can be found throughout both the left and the right. 40 Moralism, especially when it is engaged in apparently political work, is profoundly anti-political. Its promised purity depends on the possibility of a non-interpretive and fully adequate relationship to a code or set of guiding principles, a relationship in which the subjectivity, peculiarities, interests, and power of the interpreter, together with the context of the action or interpretation, are ideally of no consequence. By promising a clear and complete set of rules, ones that can be lived by without ambiguity and without cost to other equally important values, moralism expresses the desire to remain untouched by, and without implication in, that which one rejects or is working to change (even when that includes much of the world within which one must work). The point is to purify oneself of society's and politics' dirt, rather than to work in and through the dirt to rearrange it in more just and equitable ways. 41 Hence moralism's reluctance to engage the doubtful, the uncommitted, or those with opposing political convictions in serious debate and argument. Refusing to entertain the possibility of any connections between itself and the attitudes of its political opponents, the rhetoric of moralism often effectively refuses the process of argumentation itself; its invocations of the code often function as little more than gestures of one's good moral intentions--even as they express a basic mistrust, even cynicism about the value, of democratic political give and take. Thus its anti-rhetorical rhetoric drives away more than it converts, polarizing those it doesn't simply turn off from political discussion altogether. 42 Indeed, the discipline, policing, and purifying that is required to achieve the correct attitude and behavior necessarily appeal to a limited constituency. So, too, with moralism's willful reduction of the world's complexity: simply too many people know that the world is more complicated than any single code or set of codes can manage. This is especially so in a society as saturated with everyday cynicism as ours, where the thought of remaining uncontaminated by guilt, injustice, and power is an impossible one for many. As with political rhetorics more explicitly based on guilt, the pretense to purity of any form of moralizing discourse is a ripe target for cynical unmasking. To the extent that left moralism exudes a resentment at the political condition, then, it merely reinforces and recapitulates the anti-politics that is a major source of the problems it is ostensibly trying to change. 43 It sustains the mode of "politics"--with its over-simplification, polarization, inability to accommodate conflict and ambivalence, and disinterest in even listening to "the enemy"--that drives so much of contemporary cynicism and alienation from politics. It thus feeds the vicious cycle that needs to be reversed. Instead of yet another anti-political politics, the political cynic and the politically alienated need something able to pull them away from their investment in the state of emergency and its displays of technical power, by challenging their belief in the futility, aggressivity, and dreariness of political action.

#### And – Framework comes first – it is the foundation of the debate without which we cannot test and refine the arguments they are asserting

Saurette, 2000 (Paule, Ph.D. Johns Hopkins, International Journal of Peace Studies, 5:1)

#### The problem of concepts -- what they are, where they are located, how we create/discover them -- has always been close to the heart of philosophy and extends deep into the sciences and social sciences.  Within IR, this concern has generally been located in the sphere of methodology and it remains crucial to the various behaviourist - positivist - empiricist - traditionalist debates.  All but the most stubborn empiricists accept that concepts influence our thinking, the validity of studies and the utility of certain perspectives. It is not surprising, then, that some of the most heated debates in the history of IR (and international law) have focused on the proper place, method and definition of certain key concepts such as sovereignty, war, human rights, anarchy, institutions, power, and international. If all concepts are equally created, however, some become represented and treated as more equal than others. There are, in fact, different layers of conceptual understanding and degrees of articulability and these render certain concepts more or less subject to question.8 In any debate, certain understandings are shared by its participants and certain concepts must be common for communication to occur.  These concepts become the foundational layer of the debate, rarely being raised for consideration, but profoundly shaping the contours of the debate.  There have been two traditionally philosophical responses to this.  The first, more familiar to mainstream IR, might be seen as the empiricist and positivist response in which the importance of this layer is minimized and its concepts represented as 'preliminary assumptions', 'term variables', or 'operative definitions' -- voluntarily accepted concepts that are hypothetically and tentatively accepted for their heuristic value.  Because many empiricists and positivists accept an understanding of language and thought as transparent and instrumental, they generally assume that, with enough effort, all of our fundamental assumptions and concepts can be clarified and their consequences known -- allowing for, if not truthful representation, then at least useful manipulation.  While this has perhaps been the prevalent view within English philosophy since the scientific revolution, a second approach, what has been called the continental tradition of philosophy, has consistently challenged these premises.  From this perspective, Kant's definition of the project of philosophy as the search for the transcendental conditions of thought and morality is the paradigmatic challenge to the English tradition of empiricism. According to Kant (and shifting him into the language of this essay), there exist certain natural preconditions -- transcendental fields -- of thought that allow us to make sense of experience.  And while some of these necessary preconditions (categories and concepts) can be traced and categorized, others, such as the constitutive and regulative Ideas, cannot be known with the same theoretical rigor.  On this view, the concepts (Ideas) of this deep layer of shared understandings (experience) are not  transparent and available to examination.  Even those we can represent cannot be manipulated and reconfigured.  Far from being heuristic devices of our own making, they are the necessary and universal conditions of possibility for any experience and understanding.

#### The Affirmatives retreat from politics dooms their ability to change the world – it creates atrocity and causes a vacuum that gets filled by the right

Boggs, 1997 (Carl, Professor and Ph.D. in Political Science, National University, Theory and Society 26: 741-780)

The false sense of empowerment that comes with such mesmerizing impulses is accompanied by a loss of public engagement, an erosion of citizenship and a depleted capacity of individuals in large groups to work for social change. As this ideological quagmire worsens, urgent problems that are destroying the fabric of American society will go unsolved ^ perhaps even unrecognized ^ only to fester more ominously into the future. And such problems (ecological crisis, poverty, urban decay, spread of infectious diseases, technological displacement of workers) cannot be understood outside the larger social and global context of internationalized markets, finance, and communications. Paradoxically, the widespread retreat from politics, often inspired by localist sentiment, comes at a time when agendas that ignore or side- step these global realities will, more than ever, be reduced to impotence. In his commentary on the state of citizenship today, Wolin refers to the increasing sublimation and dilution of politics, as larger num- bers of people turn away from public concerns toward private ones. By diluting the life of common involvements, we negate the very idea of politics as a source of public ideals and visions.74 In the meantime, the fate of the world hangs in the balance. The unyielding truth is that, even as the ethos of anti-politics becomes more compelling and even fashionable in the United States, it is the vagaries of political power that will continue to decide the fate of human societies. This last point demands further elaboration. The shrinkage of politics hardly means that corporate colonization will be less of a reality, that social hierarchies will somehow disappear, or that gigantic state and military structures will lose their hold over people's lives. Far from it: the space abdicated by a broad citizenry, well-informed and ready to participate at many levels, can in fact be filled by authoritarian and reactionary elites ^ an already familiar dynamic in many lesser- developed countries. The fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian world, not very far removed from the rampant individualism, social Darwinism, and civic violence that have been so much a part of the American landscape, could be the prelude to a powerful Leviathan designed to impose order in the face of disunity and atomized retreat. In this way the eclipse of politics might set the stage for a reassertion of politics in more virulent guise ^ or it might help further rationalize the existing power structure. In either case, the state would likely become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of those universal, collec- tive interests that had vanished from civil society.75

**Fiat is key to being informed citizens – without it we never learn about the political process and do not take responsibility for the possible bad outcomes of our actions. Simulating policy solves all of their offense, allowing people a safe place to test new ideas**

Joyner, 1999 (Christopher C., Professor of International Law at Georgetown, “Teaching International Law”, 5 Ilsa. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 377, Lexis)

Use of the debate can be an effective pedagogical tool for education in the social sciences. Debates, like other role-playing simulations, help students understand different perspectives on a policy issue by adopting a perspective as their own. But, unlike other simulation games, debates do not require that a student participate directly in order to realize the benefit of the game. Instead of developing policy alternatives and experiencing the consequences of different choices in a traditional role-playing game, debates present the alternatives and consequences in a formal, rhetorical fashion before a judgmental audience. Having the class audience serve as jury helps each student develop a well-thought-out opinion on the issue by providing contrasting facts and views and enabling audience members to pose challenges to each debating team. These debates ask undergraduate students to examine the international legal implications of various United States foreign policy actions. Their chief tasks are to assess the aims of the policy in question, determine their relevance to United States national interests, ascertain what legal principles are involved, and conclude how the United States policy in question squares with relevant principles of international law. Debate questions are formulated as resolutions, along the lines of: "Resolved: The United States should deny most-favored-nation status to China on human rights grounds;" or "Resolved: The United States should resort to military force to ensure inspection of Iraq's possible nuclear, chemical and biological weapons facilities;" or "Resolved: The United States' invasion of Grenada in 1983 was a lawful use of force;" or "Resolved: The United States should kill Saddam Hussein." In addressing both sides of these legal propositions, the student debaters must consult the vast literature of international law, especially the nearly 100 professional law-school-sponsored international law journals now being published in the United States. This literature furnishes an incredibly rich body of legal analysis that often treats topics affecting United States foreign policy, as well as other more esoteric international legal subjects. Although most of these journals are accessible in good law schools, they are largely unknown to the political science community specializing in international relations, much less to the average undergraduate. By assessing the role of international law in United States foreign policy- making, students realize that United States actions do not always measure up to international legal expectations; that at times, international legal strictures get compromised for the sake of perceived national interests, and that concepts and principles of international law, like domestic law, can be interpreted and twisted in order to justify United States policy in various international circumstances. In this way, the debate format gives students the benefits ascribed to simulations and other action learning techniques, in that it makes them become actively engaged with their subjects, and not be mere passive consumers. Rather than spectators, students become legal advocates, observing, reacting to, and structuring political and legal perceptions to fit the merits of their case. The debate exercises carry several specific educational objectives. First, students on each team must work together to refine a cogent argument that compellingly asserts their legal position on a foreign policy issue confronting the United States. In this way, they gain greater insight into the real-world legal dilemmas faced by policy makers. Second, as they work with other members of their team, they realize the complexities of applying and implementing international law, and the difficulty of bridging the gaps between United States policy and international legal principles, either by reworking the former or creatively reinterpreting the latter. Finally, research for the debates forces students to become familiarized with contemporary issues on the United States foreign policy agenda and the role that international law plays in formulating and executing these policies. n8 The debate thus becomes an excellent vehicle for pushing students beyond stale arguments over principles into the real world of policy analysis, political critique, and legal defense.

### T

#### 1. Interpretation – “Its” is possessive of the USFG

Updegrave 91 (W.C., “Explanation of ZIP Code Address Purpose”, 8-19, <http://www.supremelaw.org/ref/zipcode/updegrav.htm>)

More specifically, looking at the map on page 11 of the National ZIP Code Directory, e.g. at a local post office, one will see that the first digit of a ZIP Code defines an area that includes more than one State. The first sentence of the explanatory paragraph begins: "A ZIP Code is a numerical code that identifies areas within the United States and its territories for purposes of ..." [cf. 26 CFR 1.1-1(c)]. Note the singular possessive pronoun "its", not "their", therefore carrying the implication that it relates to the "United States" as a corporation domiciled in the District of Columbia (in the singular sense), not in the sense of being the 50 States of the Union (in the plural sense). The map shows all the States of the Union, but it also shows D.C., Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, making the explanatory statement literally correct.

#### “Engagement” requires direct talks with a topic country

Crocker 9 – Chester Crocker, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, Former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, “Terms of Engagement”, New York Times, 9-13, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/14/opinion/14crocker.html?\_r=0

PRESIDENT OBAMA will have a hard time achieving his foreign policy goals until he masters some key terms and better manages the expectations they convey. Given the furor that will surround the news of America’s readiness to hold talks with Iran, he could start with “engagement” — one of the trickiest terms in the policy lexicon. The Obama administration has used this term to contrast its approach with its predecessor’s resistance to talking with adversaries and troublemakers. His critics show that they misunderstand the concept of engagement when they ridicule it as making nice with nasty or hostile regimes. Let’s get a few things straight. Engagement in statecraft is not about sweet talk. Nor is it based on the illusion that our problems with rogue regimes can be solved if only we would talk to them. Engagement is not normalization, and its goal is not improved relations. It is not akin to détente, working for rapprochement, or appeasement. So how do you define an engagement strategy? It does require[s] direct talks. There is simply no better way to convey authoritative statements of position or to hear responses. But establishing talks is just a first step. The goal of engagement is to change the other country’s perception of its own interests and realistic options and, hence, to modify its policies and its behavior.

#### 2. Violation – the plan is a unilateral change in policy that does not increase U.S. government dialogue with a topic government

#### 3. Voting issue:

#### 1. Limits – direct talks places a functional limit on the topic – otherwise, any change in U.S. policy can be interpreted as engagement

#### 2. Ground – talks are a stable mechanism for topic disads and counterplans – that’s key to fairness

### PTX

#### Raising the debt ceiling is likely but uncertain – time is running out

Stuart 9-26 (Jim Stewart, political blogger, Princeton graduate, “Shutdown and/or Default,” 9-26-2013, http://jimstuartnewblog.blogspot.com/2013/09/shutdown-andor-default.html)

After today, four days to go before a possible shutdown. After that, seventeen days to possible default. What's the forecast? Here's what I see, albeit with little clarity:¶ Friday or Saturday the Senate will return a clean CR at sequester spending levels back to the House. Right now, don't think Boehner can pass a clean CR without relying on Democrats. He was hoping to pass an omnibus conditional debt ceiling resolution on Saturday, before the budget vote, to get his caucus to shift focus to the debt ceiling. This afternoon, he found he doesn't have the votes. People want to see what happens on the Budget CR. So Boehner must put a conditional CR back to the Senate, ensuring a Tuesday shutdown, or ask Democrats for help. If Democrats say yes without conditions, there will be no shutdown. If they ask for something, most likely moving the budget target off the sequester levels, we will have shutdown, since the Senate won't have time to respond before the midnight Monday deadline. Best Guess: Boehner will ask for Democratic help and pass a clean CR - so no Shutdown.¶ The debt ceiling could follow a similar trajectory: the House will pass a contingent debt ceiling resolution containing a long list of demands - one year Obamacare delay, the Keystone pipeline, drilling on federal lands and offshore, reverse new EPA carbon capture rules, cut back the wings of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, etc. The Senate will strip all this out and send back a clean 14 month debt ceiling increase resolution. Meanwhile a very high stakes game of chicken will be going on: Obama says he will not negotiate the debt ceiling; Boehner says he has to and ultimately will. Boehner has raised the expectations of the GOP caucus very high - saying the debt ceiling is the maximum point of leverage with the Democrats, and that is where the GOP can make the most progress. I am very clear that Obama will not budge on this, and that the Democratic leadership team in the House and Senate will back him up. Will Boehner realize this in time? In their last big negotiation in 2011, Obama caved to save the country from default. I think Republicans expect him to cave. Will they all realize their mistake in time? And if they do, will they turn back and pass a clean resolution? Best Guess: Boehner will figure it out and decide to move with a clean resolution just in time to get it signed before October 17.¶ This is a highly hopeful forecast and I am basing it mostly on my assessment of Boehner as a person who will do the right thing - not for himself, but for his Party and his country, once he sees there are no good alternatives. Do not think he will take the lead in causing a shutdown; nor will he refuse to take a path that prevents default just to please the base. I am not at all confident, though. I assign just a 50-60% probability to the above scenario - in other words, not very high.¶ And here's another low probability forecast: If the game plays out as above, we will land on October 18 with a very angry and frustrated GOP base, an ecstatic Democratic Party, a deeply wounded Speaker Boehner, and the next budget deadline coming up on November 15, less than 30 days away. I think there's a chance that Boehner, possibly realizing his time is up as Speaker, will lead a Grand Bargain negotiation with Obama (cancel the sequester, replace it with a mix of targeted cuts, new tax revenues from tax reform, and chained CPI for Medicare and Social Security) that will pass the House with Democratic votes and be signed into law.¶ Pretty far out, I admit. I give it a 30% chance. But that's not zero. And wouldn't that be a great day for the country!

#### PC is key

Lillis & Wasson 9-7 (Mike Lillis, and Erik Wasson, The Hill, “Fears of wounding Obama weigh heavily on Democrats ahead of vote,” 9-7-2013, http://thehill.com/homenews/house/320829-fears-of-wounding-obama-weigh-heavily-on-democrats#ixzz2fOPUfPNr)

The prospect of wounding President Obama is weighing heavily on Democratic lawmakers as they decide their votes on Syria. Obama needs all the political capital he can muster heading into bruising battles with the GOP over fiscal spending and the debt ceiling. Democrats want Obama to use his popularity to reverse automatic spending cuts already in effect and pay for new economic stimulus measures through higher taxes on the wealthy and on multinational companies. But if the request for authorization for Syria military strikes is rebuffed, some fear it could limit Obama's power in those high-stakes fights. That has left Democrats with an agonizing decision: vote "no" on Syria and possibly encourage more chemical attacks while weakening their president, or vote "yes" and risk another war in the Middle East. “I’m sure a lot of people are focused on the political ramifications,” a House Democratic aide said. Rep. Jim Moran (D-Va.), a veteran appropriator, said the failure of the Syria resolution would diminish Obama's leverage in the fiscal battles. "It doesn't help him," Moran said Friday by phone. "We need a maximally strong president to get us through this fiscal thicket. These are going to be very difficult votes."

#### Plan costs capital

**Llenas 12** (Bryan, reporter for Fox News Latino, Romney vs Obama Final Debate: Why Latin America Matters, And Not Being Discussed, <http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2012/10/22/romney-vs-obama-final-debate-why-latin-america-matters-and-not-being-talked/#ixzz2Z3CxAMhH>, 10/22/12)

Political Capital So why isn't the region talked about in more specific terms? One theory has to do with two ominous words: Political Capital. "The key issues of the region touch on very sensitive domestic political issues, guns, drugs, Cuba, immigration and to fix those problems the president has to spend political capital," Piccone, who worked in the Clinton administration for 8 years, said. In other words: Solving complicated issues in the region requires complicated answers, and likely compromises on policies that could be unpopular with the American voter. "That's why the conversation is left to a safe common ground on trade," Piccone said.

#### Failure collapses global trade, investment and growth

Davidson 9-10 (Adam Davidson, co-founder of NPR’s Planet Money (Adam, “Our Debt to Society” New York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/15/magazine/our-debt-to-society.html?pagewanted=all>)

If the debt ceiling isn’t lifted again this fall, some serious financial decisions will have to be made. Perhaps the government can skimp on its foreign aid or furlough all of NASA, but eventually the big-ticket items, like Social Security and Medicare, will have to be cut. At some point, the government won’t be able to pay interest on its bonds and will enter what’s known as sovereign default, the ultimate national financial disaster achieved by countries like Zimbabwe, Ecuador and Argentina (and now Greece). In the case of the United States, though, it won’t be an isolated national crisis. If the American government can’t stand behind the dollar, the world’s benchmark currency, then the global financial system will very likely enter a new era in which there is much less trade and much less economic growth. It would be, by most accounts, the largest self-imposed financial disaster in history. Nearly everyone involved predicts that someone will blink before this disaster occurs. Yet a small number of House Republicans (one political analyst told me it’s no more than 20) appear willing to see what happens if the debt ceiling isn’t raised — at least for a bit. This could be used as leverage to force Democrats to drastically cut government spending and eliminate President Obama’s signature health-care-reform plan. In fact, Representative Tom Price, a Georgia Republican, told me that the whole problem could be avoided if the president agreed to drastically cut spending and lower taxes. Still, it is hard to put this act of game theory into historic context. Plenty of countries — and some cities, like Detroit — have defaulted on their financial obligations, but only because their governments ran out of money to pay their bills. No wealthy country has ever voluntarily decided — in the middle of an economic recovery, no less — to default. And there’s certainly no record of that happening to the country that controls the global reserve currency. Like many, I assumed a self-imposed U.S. debt crisis might unfold like most involuntary ones. If the debt ceiling isn’t raised by X-Day, I figured, the world’s investors would begin to see America as an unstable investment and rush to sell their Treasury bonds. The U.S. government, desperate to hold on to investment, would then raise interest rates far higher, hurtling up rates on credit cards, student loans, mortgages and corporate borrowing — which would effectively put a clamp on all trade and spending. The U.S. economy would collapse far worse than anything we’ve seen in the past several years.

#### Trigger nuclear wars – and turns multilat and global democracy

Merlini 11 (Cesare, nonresident senior fellow, Center on the United States and Europe, chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Italian Institute for International Affairs, “A Post-Secular World?” Survival, 53(2), 2011, ebsco, ldg)

Two neatly opposed scenarios for the future of the world order illustrate the range of possibilities, albeit at the risk of oversimplification. The first scenario entails the premature crumbling of the post-Westphalian system. One or more of the acute tensions apparent today evolves into an open and traditional **conflict** between states, perhaps even **involving the use of nuclear weapons.** The crisis might be triggered by a collapse of the global economic and financial system, the vulnerability of which we have just experienced, and the prospect of a second Great Depression, with consequences for peace and democracy similar to those of the first. Whatever the trigger, the unlimited exercise of national sovereignty, exclusive self-interest and rejection of outside interference would self-interest and rejection of outside interference would likely be amplified, emptying, perhaps entirely, the half-full glass of multilateralism, including the UN and the European Union. Many of the more likely conflicts, such as between Israel and Iran or India and Pakistan, have potential religious dimensions. Short of war, tensions such as those related to immigration might become unbearable. Familiar issues of creed and identity could be exacerbated. One way or another, the secular rational approach would be sidestepped by a return to theocratic absolutes, competing or converging with secular absolutes such as unbridled nationalism**.**

### Case

#### Prefer util

Cummiskey 90 (David, Professor of Philosophy @ Bates, Kantian Consequentialism, Ethics 100.3, p 601-2, p 606)

We must not obscure the issue by characterizing this type of case as the sacrifice of individuals for some abstract "social entity." It is not a question of some persons having to bear the cost for some elusive "overall social good." Instead, the question is whether some persons must bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other persons. Nozick, for example, argues that "to use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has."30 Why, however, is this not equally true of all those that we do not save through our failure to act? By emphasizing solely the one who must bear the cost if we act, one fails to sufficiently respect and take account of the many other separate persons, each with only one life, who will bear the cost of our inaction. In such a situation, what would a conscientious Kantian agent, an agent motivated by the unconditional value of rational beings, choose? We have a duty to promote the conditions necessary for the existence of rational beings, but both choosing to act and choosing not to act will cost the life of a rational being. Since the basis of Kant's principle is "rational nature exists as an end-in-itself' (GMM, p. 429), the reasonable solution to such a dilemma involves promoting, insofar as one can, the conditions necessary for rational beings. If I sacrifice some for the sake of other rational beings, I do not use them arbitrarily and I do not deny the unconditional value of rational beings. **Persons** may **have "dignity**, an unconditional and incomparable value" that transcends any market value (GMM, p. 436), **but**, as rational beings, persons **also** have **a fundamental equality which dictates that some must** sometimes **give way for the sake of others.** The formula of the end-in-itself thus does not support the view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others. If one focuses on the equal value of all rational beings, then equal consideration dictates that one sacrifice some to save many. [continues] According to Kant, the objective end of moral action is the existence of rational beings. Respect for rational beings requires that, in deciding what to do, one give appropriate practical consideration to the unconditional value of rational beings and to the conditional value of happiness. Since agent-centered constraints require a non-value-based rationale, the most natural interpretation of the demand that one give equal respect to all rational beings lead to a consequentialist normative theory. We have seen that there is no sound Kantian reason for abandoning this natural consequentialist interpretation. In particular, a consequentialist interpretation does not require sacrifices which a Kantian ought to consider unreasonable, and it does not involve doing evil so that good may come of it. It simply requires an uncompromising commitment to the equal value and equal claims of all rational beings and a recognition that, in the moral consideration of conduct, one's own subjective concerns do not have overriding importance.

#### Util inevitable

Green 2 (Josh Green, Assistant Professor of Psychology @ Harvard, "The Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very Bad Truth About Morality And What To Do About It", November 2002, 314)

Some people who talk of balancing rights may think there is an algorithm for deciding which rights take priority over which. If that’s what we mean by 302 “balancing rights,” then we are wise to shun this sort of talk. Attempting to solve moral problems using a complex deontological algorithm is dogmatism at its most esoteric, but dogmatism all the same. However, it’s likely that when some people talk about “balancing competing rights and obligations” they are already thinking like consequentialists in spite of their use of deontological language. Once again, what deontological language does best is express the thoughts of people struck by strong, emotional moral intuitions: “It doesn’t matter that you can save five people by pushing him to his death. To do this would be a violation of his rights!”19 That is why angry protesters say things like, “Animals Have Rights, Too!” rather than, “Animal Testing: The Harms Outweigh the Benefits!” Once again, rights talk captures the apparent clarity of the issue and absoluteness of the answer. But sometimes rights talk persists long after the sense of clarity and absoluteness has faded. One thinks, for example, of the thousands of children whose lives are saved by drugs that were tested on animals and the “rights” of those children. One finds oneself balancing the “rights” on both sides by asking how many rabbit lives one is willing to sacrifice in order to save one human life, and so on, and at the end of the day one’s underlying thought is as **thoroughly consequentialist** as can be, **despite** the **deontological gloss**. And what’s wrong with that? Nothing, except for the fact that the deontological gloss adds nothing and furthers the myth that there really are “rights,” etc. Best to drop it. When deontological talk gets sophisticated, the thought it represents is either dogmatic in an esoteric sort of way or covertly consequentialist

#### Extinction outweighs ontology

**Jonas 96** (Hans Jonas, Professor of Philosophy @ New School for Social Research, “Mortality and Morality: A Search for the Good after Auschwitz,” pg 111-2)

With this look ahead at an ethics for the future, we are touching at the same time upon the question of the future of freedom. The unavoidable discussion of this question seems to give rise to misunderstandings. My dire prognosis that not only our material standard of living but also our democratic freedoms would fall victim to the growing pressure of a worldwide ecological crisis, until finally there would remain only some form of tyranny that would try to save the situation, has led to the accusation that I am defending dictatorship as a solution to our problems. I shall ignore here what is a confusion between warning and recommendation. But I have indeed said that such a tyranny would still be better than total ruin; thus, I have ethically accepted it as an alternative. I must now defend this standpoint, which I continue to support, before the court that I myself have created with the main argument of this essay. For are we not contradicting ourselves in prizing physical survival at the price of freedom? Did we not say that freedom was the condition of our capacity for responsibility—and that this capacity was a reason for the survival of humankind? By tolerating tyranny as an alternative to physical annihilation are we not violating the principle we established: that the How of existence must not take precedence over its Why? Yet we can make a terrible concession to the primacy of physical survival in the conviction that the ontological capacity for freedom, inseparable as it is from man’s being, cannot really be extinguished, only temporarily banished from the public realm. This conviction can be supported by experience we are all familiar with. We have seen that even in the most totalitarian societies the urge for freedom on the part of some individuals cannot be extinguished, and this renews our faith in human beings. Given this faith, we have reason to hope that, as long as there are human beings who survive, the image of God will continue to exist along with them and will wait in concealment for its new hour. With that hope—which in this particular case takes precedence over fear—it is permissible, for the sake of physical survival, to accept if need be a temporary absence of freedom in the external affairs of humanity. This is, I want to emphasize, a worst-case scenario, and it is the foremost task of responsibility at this particular moment in world history to prevent it from happening. This is in fact one of the noblest of duties (and at the same time one concerning self-preservation), on the part of the imperative of responsibility to avert future coercion that would lead to lack of freedom by acting freely in the present, thus preserving as much as possible the ability of future generations to assume responsibility. But more than that is involved. At stake is the preservation of the Earth’s entire miracle of creation, of which our human existence is a part and before which man reverently bows, even without philosophical “grounding.” Here too faith may precede and reason follow; it is faith that longs for this preservation of the Earth (fides quaerens intellectum), and reason comes as best it can to faith’s aid with arguments, not knowing or even asking how much depends on its success or failure in determining what action to take. With this confession of faith we come to the end of our essay ontology.

#### Don’t prefer any ontology --- accept all because there is no warrant to prefer one over another.

Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, 2010. Associate Professor of International Relations in the School of International Service at the American University in Washington, DC. “The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and its Implications for the Study of World Politics,” p 27-8.

Jackson 10 (Patrick Jackson, associate Professor of International Relations in the School of International Service @ American, “The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and its Implications for the Study of World Politics,” p 27-8)

However, I do not think that putting ontology first in the panacea that many seem to think it is. For one thing, if one puts ontology first then one is, at least provisionally, committed to a particular (if revisable) account of what the world is made up of: co-constituted agents and structures, states interacting under conditions of anarchy, global class relations, or what have you. **This is a rather large leap to make on anyone’s authority**, let alone that of a philosopher of science. Along these lines, **it is unclear what if any *warrant* we could provide for most ontological claims if ontology in this sense were to always “come first**.” If someone makes an ontological claim about something existing in the world, then we are faced with an intriguing epistemological problem of how possibly to know whether that claim is true, and the equally intriguing problem of selecting the proper methods to use in evaluating that claim (Chernoff 2009b, 391). But if epistemology and method are supposed to be fitted to ontology, then we are stuck with techniques and standards designed to respond to the specificity of the object under investigation. This problem is roughly akin to using state-centric measurements of cross-border transactions to determine whether globalization is eroding state borders, because the very object under investigation—“state borders”—is presupposed by the procedures of data collection, meaning that the answer will always, and necessarily, assert the persistence of the state.

#### Even if they win their arguments, they have not contested whether or not human extinction is bad---even if we should focus on everything, humans are important as well

#### Their argument is ethically naïve—ethics should be grounded in direct experience—pain and consciousness should be our moral guidelines.

Phelps 2009

Norm, animal rights activist and author of The Longest Struggle: Animal Advocacy from Pythagoras to PETA, “The Quest for a Boundless Ethic: A Reassessment of Albert Schweitzer” Journal for Critical Animal Studies, VII.1

Here, Schweitzer makes no distinction between the way we should treat sentient and insentient beings. It is life defined as the ability to grow and reproduce that grants ethical standing, not the ability to experience suffering and joy. For reasons that I will discuss in a moment, this constitutes an ethical naïveté that would surprise us in a thinker of Schweitzer‘s depth and originality if we had not encountered the same naïveté in his one-man crusade to re-make European civilization and reverse the flow of history. Schweitzer‘s errors are often the errors of noble overreaching. In the Preface to Fear and Trembling, Soren Kierkegaard identified the cardinal sin of 19th century philosophy (and Schweitzer is nothing if not a 19th century philosopher) as the urge to “go beyond” established and accepted principles that have stood the test of time. And Kierkegaard‘s critique of “going beyond”—that it becomes a denial of the original principle and, therefore, instead of going beyond it, falls short of it—applies to “reverence for life” as well. By trying to go beyond love and compassion, Schweitzer‘s ethic—as defined in The Philosophy of Civilization—fails even to equal it. To Will or to Want, That is the Question Like its English cognate, the German noun Wille—at least in everyday usage—implies intention and desire, and therefore, consciousness. Likewise, the related verb wollen (first and third person singular, present active indicative: will), which can be translated into English as either “to will” or “to want,” is the common, everyday verb meaning “to want.” When a German speaker wants a stein of beer, she says “Ich will ein Stein.” “I want to go home” is “Ich will nach Haus gehen.” In the jargon of 19th century German philosophy, however, especially the bastardized Buddhism of Arthur Schopenhauer, the noun Wille acquired the meaning of a vital, but impersonal, force that is the ultimate reality underlying the world of appearances that we experience day-to-day. With this in mind, let‘s revisit a statement of Schweitzer‘s that I quoted above in the standard English translation. In Schweitzer‘s original German, “I am life which wills to live, in the midst of life which wills to live,” is “Ich bin Leben, dass leben will, inmitten von Leben, dass leben will” (Association Internationale), which can just as easily, and a lot more naturally, be translated, “I am life that wants to live surrounded by life that wants to live.” But the translator could not use the more straightforward, natural translation because “wants” implies conscious desire, and Schweitzer makes it clear in the passage about not picking a leaf or plucking a flower that he is including in Leben, “life,” everything that grows and reproduces, not simply beings who are sentient and conscious. In the course of identifying his own will-to-live with all other wills-to-live, Schweitzer systematically confuses the technical, Schopenhaurian meaning of Wille with the commonsense, everyday meaning, a confusion that is facilitated by the happenstance that wollen can mean both “want” and “will.” We can empathize with other wills to live, he tells us, because we can experience our own. But if another will-to-live cannot experience itself (or anything else), what is there to empathize with? Consciousness can empathize with consciousness, but to say that consciousness can empathize with an unconscious force is to commit a pathetic fallacy. In short, Schweitzer anchors his ethical thinking to consciousness, which he initially identifies with the “will-to-live.” But he then uses the dual meaning of “will” to extend his ethic to unconscious beings, apparently failing to realize that he has cut it loose from its original moorings. This equivocation is the undoing of reverence for life as Schweitzer describes it in The Philosophy of Civilization. An ethic based on love and compassion is grounded directly in experience. I know from immediate, undeniable experience that my **pain is evil**. Therefore, I can empathize with your pain and know apodictically that it is also evil. The empathy of an ethic based on love and compassion is a valid empathy. An ethic based on will-to-live understood (at least sometimes) as distinct from and prior to consciousness is grounded in an intellectual abstraction, not direct experience. In this regard, Schweitzer‘s “will-to-live” differs little from Descartes‘ “thought”. Its empathy is an illusion of abstract thinking. To use Schweitzer‘s examples that I quoted above, if I crush an insect I have destroyed a will-to-live that is conscious of itself and wants to continue living, wants to experience pleasure and avoid pain. I know that this is evil because I know directly, immediately, unarguably, that it would be evil if done to me. But neither the leaf nor the tree, the flower nor the plant on which it grows, is conscious. And so when I tear a leaf from a tree or pluck a flower, I do nothing wrong unless I indirectly harm a sentient being, such as a caterpillar for whom the leaf was food or shelter or a honeybee who needs the nectar from the flower. I have caused no pain. I have deprived of life nothing that wanted to live, nothing, in fact, that experienced life in any way. In terms of the suffering I have caused, I might as well have broken a rock with a hammer. All sentient beings are valid objects of love and compassion, and only sentient beings are valid objects of love and compassion. Comparing the crushing of an insect to pulling a leaf from a tree or picking a flower trivializes the crushing of the insect by negating the insect‘s consciousness, and it is in that regard that reverence for life, as Schweitzer originally conceived it, falls short of an ethic based on love and compassion by trying to reach beyond it.

Human extinction comes first – turns the kritik

**Matheny 07** (J. G. Matheny, Ph. D. candidate, Bloomberg School of Public Health, Johns Hopkins University, December 6, 2007, “Ought we worry about human extinction?,” online: <http://jgmatheny.org/extinctionethics.htm>)

Moral philosophers have not written much about human extinction. This may be because they underestimate the potential benefits of human survival and/or the risks of human extinction. If we survive the next few centuries, humanity could allow Earth-originating life to survive a trillion years or more. If we do not survive, Earth-originating life will probably perish within a billion years. If prolonging the survival of Earth-originating life is morally important, then there may be nothing more important than reducing the near-term risks of human extinction. Keywords: extinction, population ethics, intergenerational justice, catastrophic risk, existential risk, risk analysis, animal welfare, environmental ethics Word count: 3,400 Introduction It was only in the last century, with the invention of nuclear weapons, that the probability of human extinction could be appreciably affected by human action. Ever since, human extinction has generally been considered a terrible possibility. It’s surprising, then, that a search of JSTOR and the Philosopher’s Index suggests contemporary philosophers have written little about the ethics of human extinction. In fact, they seem to have written more about the extinction of other animals. Maybe this is because they consider human extinction impossible or inevitable; or maybe human extinction seems inconsequential compared to other moral issues. In this paper I argue that the possibility of human extinction deserves more attention. While extinction events may be very improbable, their consequences are grave. Human extinction would not only condemn to non-existence all future human generations, it would also cut short the existence of all animal life, as natural events will eventually make Earth uninhabitable. The value of future lives Leslie (1996) suggests philosophers’ nonchalance toward human extinction is due in large part to disagreements in population ethics. Some people suppose it does not matter if the number of lives lived in the future is small -- at its limit, zero.[2] In contrast, I assume here that moral value is a function of both the quality and number of lives in a history.[3] This view is consistent with most people’s intuition about extinction (that it’s bad) and with moral theories under which life is considered a benefit to those who have it, or under which life is a necessary condition for producing things of value (Broome, 2004; Hare, 1993; Holtug 2001, Ng, 1989; Parfit 1984; Sikora, 1978). For instance, some moral theories value things like experiences, satisfied preferences, achievements, friendships, or virtuous acts, which take place only in lives. On this view, an early death is bad (at least in part) because it cuts short the number of these valuable things. Similarly, on this view, an early extinction is bad (at least in part) because it cuts short the number of these valuable things. I think this view is plausible and think our best reasons for believing an early death is bad are our best reasons for believing an early extinction is bad. But such a view is controversial and I will not settle the controversy here. I start from the premise that we ought to increase moral value by increasing both the quality and number of lives throughout history. I also take it, following Singer (2002), this maxim applies to all sentient beings capable of positive subjective feelings. Life’s prospects The human population is now 6 billion (6 x 109). There are perhaps another trillion (1012) sentient animals on Earth, maybe a few orders more, depending on where sentience begins and ends in the animal kingdom (Gaston, Blackburn, and Goldewijk, 2003; Gaston and Evans, 2004). Animal life has existed on Earth for around 500 million years. Barring a dramatic intervention, all animal life on Earth will die in the next several billion years. Earth is located in a field of thousands of asteroids and comets. 65 million years ago, an asteroid 10 kilometers in size hit the Yucatan , creating clouds of dust and smoke that blocked sunlight for months, probably causing the extinction of 90% of animals, including dinosaurs. A 100 km impact, capable of extinguishing all animal life on Earth, is probable within a billion years (Morrison et al., 2002). If an asteroid does not extinguish all animal life, the Sun will. In one billion years, the Sun will begin its Red Giant stage, increasing in size and temperature. Within six billion years, the Sun will have evaporated all of Earth’s water, and terrestrial temperatures will reach 1000 degrees -- much too hot for amino acid-based life to persist. If, somehow, life were to survive these changes, it will die in 7 billion years when the Sun forms a planetary nebula that irradiates Earth (Sackmann, Boothroyd, Kraemer, 1993; Ward and Brownlee, 2002). Earth is a dangerous place and animal life here has dim prospects. If there are 1012 sentient animals on Earth, only 1021 life-years remain. The only hope for terrestrial sentience surviving well beyond this limit is that some force will deflect large asteroids before they collide with Earth, giving sentients another billion or more years of life (Gritzner and Kahle, 2004); and/or terrestrial sentients will colonize other solar systems, giving sentients up to another 100 trillion years of life until all stars begin to stop shining (Adams and Laughlin, 1997). Life might survive even longer if it exploits non-stellar energy sources. But it is hard to imagine how life could survive beyond the decay of nuclear matter expected in 1032 to 1041 years (Adams and Laughlin, 1997). This may be the upper limit on the future of sentience.[4] Deflecting asteroids and colonizing space could delay the extinction of Earth-originating sentience from 109 to 1041 years. Assuming an average population of one trillion sentients is maintained (which is a conservative assumption under colonization[5]), these interventions would create between 1021 and 1053[billion] life-years. At present on Earth, only a human civilization would be remotely capable of carrying out such projects. If humanity survives the next few centuries, it’s likely we will develop technologies needed for at least one of these projects. We may already possess the technologies needed to deflect asteroids (Gritzner and Kahle, 2004; Urias et al., 1996). And in the next few centuries, we’re likely to develop technologies that allow colonization. We will be strongly motivated by self-interest to colonize space, as asteroids and planets have valuable resources to mine, and as our survival ultimately requires relocating to another solar system (Kargel, 1994; Lewis, 1996). Extinction risks Being capable of preserving sentient life for another 1041 years makes human survival important. There may be nothing more important. If the human species is extinguished, all known sentience and certainly all Earth-originating sentience will be extinguished within a few billion years. We ought then pay more attention to what Bostrom (2002) has called “existential risks” -- risks “where an adverse outcome would either annihilate Earth-originating intelligent life or permanently and drastically curtail its potential.” Such risks include: an asteroid or comet strikes Earth, creating enough debris to shut down photosynthesis for months; a supervolcano erupts, creating enough debris to shut down photosynthesis; a nearby supernova unleashes deadly radiation that reaches Earth; greenhouse gasses cause a radical change in climate; a nuclear holocaust creates enough debris to cause a “nuclear winter,” shutting down photosynthesis; a genetically engineered microbe is unleashed, by accident or design, killing most or all of humanity; or a high-energy physics experiment goes awry, creating a “true” vacuum or strangelets, destroying the Earth (Bostrom 2002; Bostrom and Cirkovic 2006; Leslie 1996, Posner 2004, Rees 2003). To me, most of these risks seem very unlikely. But dishearteningly, in their catalogs of these risks, Britain ’s Astronomer Royal, Sir Martin Rees (2003), gives humanity 50-50 odds of surviving the next few centuries, and philosophers John Leslie (1996) and Nick Bostrom (2002) put our chances at 70% and 75%, respectively.

#### Our value statements are true – we can make particular judgments without universal validity

Linda Zerilli 2009 (prof of political science, University of Chicago, Signs 2009, Toward a Feminist Theory of Judgment)

Just because a particular claim (local idea) does not achieve articulation as universal (best idea) and in this way come to stand for the aspirations of political women across national borders does not make it either meaningless (with no relation to universality) or dangerous (an instance of particularism and relativism) in the way that Nussbaum assumes. There are numbers of claims that have never attained such status (e.g., the political claims of women in the past or of sexual minorities today), yet their particularity may well harbor another way of thinking about what counts as universal. Holding that the best ideas (the universal) are always already shared across cultural borders, in other words, excludes local ideas (the particular) as critically relevant and makes it seem, to speak with Judith Butler, as if “there can be no competing versions of universality” (2000, 164). What would it mean to take the contexts of local particularity as a starting point for a critical political encounter in which the universal criteria for cross-cultural judgments could be articulated rather than assumed? The problem, after all, is not the ongoing search for universal values (Nussbaum 2000) or “normative principles to guide our judgments and deliberations in complex human situations” (Benhabib 2002, 37) but the presumption that this search will discover something that is always already there (shared by Western and non-Western cultures alike). Instead of thinking about our political practice in terms of either cultural exportation (as the old universalism understood it) or cultural attribution (as the new universalism suggests), we might think about it with Butler in terms of cultural translation. Such translation is a political practice of making cross-cultural judgments and claims in an idiom that others can come to recognize as shared. Translation is necessary, writes Butler, because in each cultural context “there is an established rhetoric for the assertion of universality and a set of norms that are invoked in the recognition of such claims. . . . Thus, for the claim to work, for it . . . to enact the very universality it enunciates, it must undergo a set of translations into the various rhetorical and cultural contexts in which the meaning and force of universal claims are made” (2000, 35). These contexts are irreducibly local. Local ideas may be the source of arguments for cultural relativism, but they are also the main vehicle through which cross-cultural agreements about values are reached. To understand the search for universal values as an act of cultural translation rather than exportation (the old universalism) or attribution (the new universalism) is to refuse to assume from the start an agreement that needs to be worked out politically. And it is to treat the local or particular as a potential source of ever new iterations of universality, where the very idea of the universal will not be decided once and for all but will always remain open to further political interrogation.

#### Attempts to equate humans with other forms of matter destroys the pursuit of trans-humanism

DE MAGALHÃES 2008(João Pedro, Lecturer in the School of Biological Sciences at the University of Liverpool in England [equivalent to an assistant professor in the US system], “>H: The Sky Is the Limit,” http://jp.senescence.info/thoughts/transhumanism.html)

Humans are not a finished product; we are evolving organisms, waiting for the right conditions to blossom. We can and we must evolve beyond natural and biological limits. It is our destiny. Contra naturam, the defiance of Nature, has lead us to increase our quality of life and longevity. In fact, Nature has committed countless crimes against humanity: plagues and diseases, earthquakes and floods, pests, poisonous plants, and aging; Nature created us to suffer and die. In fact, if it wasn't for Dr. Fleming's penicillin, I would be naturally dead because I had pneumonia when I was a child. It went against Nature and I'm happy for it. We have been and will continue to fight and adapt Nature using our technology and intelligence. (By "fighting Nature," I don't mean destroying the rainforest. I actually support conservation efforts and I think we can learn much from other species. What I mean is that the human condition should supplant, like it does to some degree, what Nature intended for us humans.) When we win the battle against Nature we will not be humans anymore, we will be better than humans. At present, our top priority must be to fight aging, but if we can achieve such lofty goal, we will have a world of opportunities to upgrade ourselves using genetics, cybernetics, and nanotechnology.

#### That solves everything

BOSTROM 2009(Nick, Oxford University, Faculty of Philosophy, The Global Spiral, Feb 5, <http://www.metanexus.net/magazine/tabid/68/id/10687/Default.aspx>)

The prospect of posthumanity is feared for at least two reasons. One is that the state of being posthuman might in itself be degrading, so that by becoming posthuman we might be harming ourselves. Another is that posthumans might pose a threat to “ordinary” humans. (I shall set aside a third possible reason, that the development of posthumans might offend some supernatural being.) The most prominent bioethicist to focus on the first fear is Leon Kass: Most of the given bestowals of nature have their given species-specified natures: they are each and all of a given sort. Cockroaches and humans are equally bestowed but differently natured. To turn a man into a cockroach—as we don’t need Kafka to show us—would be dehumanizing. To try to turn a man into more than a man might be so as well. We need more than generalized appreciation for nature’s gifts. We need a particular regard and respect for the special gift that is our own given nature.5 Transhumanists counter that nature’s gifts are sometimes poisoned and should not always be accepted. Cancer, malaria, dementia, aging, starvation, unnecessary suffering, cognitive shortcomings are all among the presents that we wisely refuse. Our own species-specified natures are a rich source of much of the thoroughly unrespectable and unacceptable—susceptibility for disease, murder, rape, genocide, cheating, torture, racism. The horrors of nature in general and of our own nature in particular are so well documented6 that it is astonishing that somebody as distinguished as Leon Kass should still in this day and age be tempted to rely on the natural as a guide to what is desirable or normatively right. We should be grateful that our ancestors were not swept away by the Kassian sentiment, or we would still be picking lice off each other’s backs. Rather than deferring to the natural order, transhumanists maintain that we can legitimately reform ourselves and our natures in accordance with humane values and personal aspirations.

#### pragmatism is superior to analysis of ecological relations for truth

Hellmann, 09 [professor of political science at Goethe University, “Beliefs as Rules for Action: Pragmatism as a Theory of Thought and Action” International Studies Review, Volume 11, Issue 3, Pages 638-662]

While this is not the place for an in-depth analysis of the possible causes of the resurgent interest in pragmatism, a pointer at two connected factors may be allowed. The first relates to the disturbances in international politics in the aftermaths of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact in 1989/1990 and the terrorist attacks on the twin towers in September 2001. The second has to do with an increasing appreciation in IR of an internal perspective on such real world developments—that is, a perspective which tries to understand how individual and collective actors make sense of such occurrences. Such a turn to an internal (or reconstructive) perspective—as opposed to an external (or explanatory) perspective has accompanied, among others, the rise of "constructivism" and "postmodernism" in general and the refinement of a diverse set of "discursive" approaches in particular. This confluence of real world developments and disciplinary shifts provided an extremely fertile soil for the rediscovery of the much older tradition of pragmatism. This is due to the fact that pragmatism promises to steer a clear course between the Scylla of eternal repetition without any sensorium for novelty (positivism) and the Charybdis of aloof criticism without a sufficiently strong grounding in everyday **real-life problems** (postmodernism). Pragmatism's attractiveness stems, at least in part, from its anti-"istic" disposition. In contrast to other "paradigms" or "research programs" in IR, it does not lend itself as easily to paradigmatist treatment (cf. Lapid 1989). Richard Bernstein suggested that pragmatism ought to be thought of as a tradition in the sense of a "narrative of an argument" which is "only recovered by an argumentative retelling of that narrative which will itself be in conflict with other argumentative retellings." In this view, the history of pragmatism has not only been a conflict of narratives "but a forteriori, a conflict of metanarratives" (Bernstein 1995:54). Thus, whereas many Realists, Liberals, or Constructivists are keen on building research programs, most pragmatists abstain from such endeavors (and the paradigmatic battles that necessarily accompany fights over the true core), not least because most of them sympathize with Richard Rorty's plea for "liberal irony." As "liberal ironists" accept the contingency of language, they are also accepting the impossibility of reaching any such things as a "final vocabulary" (Rorty 1989:73–95). As this forum shows, the very diverse recourse to different pragmatist themes that social philosophers such as Richard Bernstein, Jürgen Habermas (1999:7–64), Hilary Putnam (1987, 1995), Richard Rorty (1982, 1998), and Nicholas Rescher (1995) note with regard to philosophical debates, also shows up in the reception of pragmatism in IR.1 In the spirit of this diversity in recovering the pragmatist tradition, one way to claim a distinctive accent is to present pragmatism as a coherent theory of thought and action (Hellmann 2009). "Theory" is synonymous here with "doctrine" or "axiom"—a belief held to be true, or, more pragmatically still, a tool to think about thought and action which is held to enable us to cope better. The core of this theory is the primacy of practice—"perhaps the central" principle of the pragmatist tradition (Putnam 1995:52; emphasis in original). According to this principle, the inevitability of individual as well as collective action is to be thought of as the necessary starting point of any theorizing about thought and action. Most social action is habitualized. As William James put it, our beliefs live "on a credit system." They "'pass,' so long as nothing challenges them" (James [1907] 1995:80). Yet as we cannot flee from interacting with our environment and as the world keeps interfering with our beliefs, we have to readjust. In such "problematic situations," a (very practical) form of "inquiry" helps us to find appropriate new ways of coping with the respective problems at hand. Experience (that is, past thoughts and actions of ourselves as well as others), expectation (that is, intentions as to desired future states of the world we act in as well as predictions as to likely future states), and creative intelligence merge in producing a new belief (Dewey [1938] 1991:41–47, 105–122, 248–251; see also Jackson in this forum). The shorthand which many pragmatists have used to express this interplay is that beliefs are rules for action (Peirce [1878] 1997:33; James [1907] 1995:18) This very condensed version of the core of pragmatism has far-reaching consequences. The view that a belief is a habit of action implies, among other things, that all anyone can have (and needs to have) is his or her own point of view. As a matter of fact this "insistence on the agent point of view" is just another way of expressing the primacy of practice and the "epistemology" that follows from it: "If we find that we must take a certain point of view, use a certain 'conceptual system,' when we are engaged in practical activity, in the widest sense of 'practical activity,' then we must not simultaneously advance the claim that it is not really 'the way things are in themselves'" (Putnam 1987:70) From Dewey onwards, pragmatists have rejected the "spectator theory of knowledge" which Putnam alludes to here—that is, the view that our beliefs do (or can) somehow "correspond" to some reality "out there." No doubt: we have to cope with reality, but to do so successfully, our beliefs do not have to "correspond" to it. For pragmatists, beliefs are not to be thought of as "a kind of picture made out of mind-stuff" which represents reality. Rather they are "tools for handling reality" (Rorty 1991:118). Most importantly our beliefs are tools which depend in a fundamental way on language. Thus, Dewey properly called language "the tool of tools" (Dewey [1925] 1981:134) directly following on Charles Sanders Peirce, the very first exponent of what later became to be known as the "linguistic turn" (Rorty [1967] 1992). For pragmatists, Peirce's famous line about man being thought (my language is the sum total of myself; for a man is the thought; Peirce [1868] 2000:67) had in many ways foreshadowed an obvious solution to a philosophical debate which had dominated for centuries (and continues to do so in some quarters even now). Rather than positioning themselves on either side in the debate on "realism" versus "antirealism" pragmatists reject the very distinction as it relies misleadingly on an understanding of truth as accurate representation. Yet as Donald Davidson convincingly argued "beliefs are true or false, but they represent nothing. It is good to be rid of representations, and with them the correspondence theory of truth, for it is thinking there are representations that engenders intimations of relativism" (Davidson [1998] 2002:46). The radical conclusion after having gotten rid (with Quine and Davdison) of all three "dogmas of empiricism," then, is that language is a tool for coping with the world rather than for representing reality or for finding truth. Moreover, as is the case with any kind of tool, languages are "made rather than found" (Rorty 1989:7). Just as the craftsperson may have to adapt his or her tools in dealing with new types of tasks so human beings in general are always dependent on coming up with new descriptions for new situations to cope adequately. Yet neither these descriptions nor the vocabularies on which they are based are "out there." Rather, descriptions are the result of the intelligent use of words and vocabularies which have been invented and adapted in a gradual process of collective habituation. As Markus Kornprobst argues in this forum, the use of analogies or metaphors is a particularly good illustration of this point. In this sense, methods provide the central tools for science (which Dewey defined as "the perfected outcome of learning"). Two points are worth emphasizing in this context. First, as Dewey put it, "never is method something outside of the material." Rather, good scholarship (as "methodized" inquiry) is characterized by making intelligent connections between subject matter and method. As there is always a danger of methods becoming "mechanized and rigid, mastering an agent instead of being powers at command for his own ends," the scholar has to strike a proper balance between proven techniques based on prior experience with similar problems on the one hand and innovation based on the novelty (or "problematicness") of the problem at hand on the other. "Cases are like, not identical." Therefore, existing methods, "however authorized they may be, have to be adapted to the exigencies of particular cases" (all quotes from Dewey [1916] 2008; see also Sil in this forum). Second, the central role attached to methods as tools for problem-solving also has implications with regard to two other key concepts usually addressed as a sort of trinity in elaborating one's position vis-à-vis science and scholarship, that is, **ontology** and **epistemology**. **Pragmatism**, in essence, **dispenses with both**. The "question of ontology"—that is, the question of "what exists" (Wendt 1999:22)—which scientific realists, among others, consider to be of central importance, does not arise for pragmatists simply because an "as if" assumption usually suffices to deal with those aspects of reality (for example, an "international system" or a "state"), which we cannot observe directly. Consequently, an "ontological grounding" of science is only worrisome if one had reason to worry about "the really real" (Rorty 1991:52). Pragmatists see none. The state is experienced as "real" when I pay taxes or refuse to go to war for it. Thus, establishing intersubjective understandings as to how to deal successfully with reality is all that is needed. This is another way of describing what pragmatists view as "knowledge": The quality of a certain description of reality (in terms of specific conceptual distinctions and choices of vocabularies) will show in its consequences when we act upon it. Knowledge in this sense is, as Wittgenstein has argued, "in the end based on acknowledgement" (Wittgenstein 1975:§378). The "question of epistemology" similarly dissolves as the answer to it is the same one which pragmatists give to the question of action: you settle for a belief (as a rule for action) through inquiry. Thinking and acting are two sides of the same coin. The question of how people think would become a problem only if there were a problem with the way people think. But, as Louis Menand has pointedly put it, "pragmatists don't believe there is a problem with the way people think. They believe there is a problem with the way people think they think"—that is, they believe that alternative "epistemologies" which separate thought and action are mistaken as they create misleading conceptual puzzles. In dissolving the question of epistemology in the context of a unified theory of thought and action pragmatism therefore "unhitches" human beings from "a useless structure of bad abstractions about thought" (Menand 1997:xi).

#### Giving academics control over policy empirically fails – First, academic criticism is NOT responsive to narrowly defined policy, and criticism is not neutral—we must always prefer political analysis to academic critical nonsense

Lipshutz, 2011- Prof of Politics at UC Santa Cruz, speaking after hearing a policy debate in which the affirmative read a straight up policy aff and the negative read a security criticism (Ronnie, Speaking about the final round at the California Round Robin, Feb 18, Accessed here: <http://nfltv.org/2011/02/24/cal-round-robin-policy/> JC)

RONNIE LIPSCHUTZ: Well, many many years ago, one day when I was reading the San Francisco chronicle I clipped a little phrase. I’ve never been able to find it, but it was something like, one of the emperor Fredrichs said the surest way to ruin your country is to put it under the charge of college professors. I have to say that I am now fully convinced of the truth of that statement. But since I have been charged here with taking on the philosophical side of things, I wanna make a few point about in particular the negative arguments but also I think about the the affirmative. I’m not a debater by the way, so I don’t quite understand what’s been going on. But what I think in particular is a problem is, first of all, we have sort of incommensurate conceptual sort of categories going on here that the affirmative is taking a farther narrow policy question and proposing a change to it. The negative then raises these questions of epistemology and ontology which in a way **are not** obvious **confronting the policy question which**, and I agree with Erin, **is very very narrowly construed**. I mean, there was no sort of question about, well, let me put it this way: that although there was a discussion of the virtues of the alliance with Japan, It was largely taken as a given and therefore of course that causes a problem, and **by taking this sort of epistemological and ontological approach**, its sort of, **its ships passing in the night.** And then of course the theory question came up, and that I thought was problematic for both sides. A couple of things I wanna say. The first one is that, **social constructions can kill.** And I think this is a very important sort of thing to remember that, threats can be socially constructed but threats, social constructions have material components, and they are aimed in particular directions. So the fact that something is a social construction or is epistemologically and ontologically questionable does not mean that there aren’t missiles being deployed, and that those missiles are not going to go off. These arguments are I think operating at a somewhat different space, it does raise a question of how is it that we judge what is a threat in the first place. And of course we have nuclear friends and nuclear enemies. You ought to ask the question, “Why is it that Great Britain has nuclear weapons and yet there is nobody, as far as I know, that is planning a war with Great Britain?”. Now I could be wrong about this, since the Pentagon probably has plenty of analysts who have nothing to do ERIN SIMPSON: They make power points LIPSHUTZ: Yeah, they make power points. So that, then, of course raises some of these epistemological questions. Which I think if you want to somehow deploy the stuff that it seems like, sadly, I have said somewhere that it is important to sort of take that much more carefully into account. The other thing that I am sort of struck by is that I’ve become in recent, in the last year ago a great fan of Pierre Bourdieu. All of these guys, all of my friends that you were citing, although I don’t consider Mearshimer a friend, as I listen to this I think, what, you know, what patent nonsense it is that they are basically spouting. But **this is the way that the academic realm goes**, you know. I mean its attack and counter-attack. And I think you have to be very careful again in interrogating, so If you’ve got to be critical, you should be very critical of those who are critical, you know, to ask what is the politics behind the critique. Because **there are politics in all of this.** Not just politics in the policy, okay, and interests and all kinds of deeply imbedded commitments, which are impossible to change. If you watch congress in action right now, you can see that. But also that there is a kind of, I mean its, **academics is more by other means**, I guess, to take a leaf from both Clausewitz and Foucault. Anyway, to go back to Bourdieu. Bourdieu, who’s a sociologist who died several years ago, has a sort of very interesting approach to some of these things which is oriented around practice. You know, what are the practices that groups, societies, engage in, and how do we understand those practices reinforcing normative beliefs and policies and approaches. Okay, and **If you really are interested in how do things change, you have to look at how practices change rather than intellectual arguments on the one hand or arming to the teeth on the other.** So perhaps I would encourage, you know, if you are to go on with debate, you should probably take a look at Bourdieu. I’m done.

**Don’t change rhetoric – status quo is key to effective movements**

**Dabelko 97** – director, Environmental Change and Security Project (Geoffrey, Environment and Security, SAIS Review 17.1, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais\_review/v017/17.1dabelko.html)

Undoubtedly, environment and security research, rhetoric, and activities--and the sobering statistics and trenchant analyses of environment and population dynamics that accompany them--have significantly raised the profile of many environmental concerns. They have also generated many useful discussions and new ways of thinking among a diverse set of experts, including those who previously considered the environment peripheral or unimportant to their interests. At the same time, there are serious limitations to the environment and security conceptual and linguistic framework. As convincing as certain security-related arguments may be, they are not the only reasons why the American public, decisionmakers, and other nations should care about the environment. Value-oriented considerations about the aesthetics of nature, human responsibility for global stewardship, and humanitarian concerns are also important. These considerations [End Page 141] can greatly enhance the process of **formulating effective solutions and winning sustained public attention** **and support for** international **environmental action**. Policymakers might therefore be best served by framing international environmental priorities in terms of a broad set of interests, including, but not limited to, security concerns. They should resist the temptation, common in security analyses, to examine environmental problems solely in terms of crises and "threats." Though helpful in setting priorities, threat-based analyses can have the unintentional effect of encouraging decisionmakers to pay attention to issues only when crises are imminent, by which time it is often too late for effective interventions and corrective measures. Examining how environmental preservation will enhance security and other interests over time might lead decisionmakers to adopt more appropriate long-term strategies to address the underlying causes of problems. International environmental issues will be most effectively addressed in the decades to come through a combination of conceptual clarity, a pragmatic and multidisciplinary approach to problem solving, an emphasis on long-term strategies, and an improved willingness and ability among leaders to explain the complexity of environmental change. As the debates on environment and security continue, environmentalists' arguments will be strengthened if they resist the temptation to place all their priorities under the attention-grabbing security rubric. Meanwhile, skeptical foreign policy experts will benefit from recognizing the real and potential effects of environmental change and their relevance to many critical interests. As the United States considers security expenditures and priorities for the twenty-first century, the vibrant debates concerning environment and security matters will continue to be instructive.

#### Abandonment of humanist values leaves us unable to act to stop atrocities and threatens the survival of the universe

**Ketels, 96** [Violet B, Associate Professor of English at Temple University “‘Havel to the Castle’ The Power of the Word,” 548 Annals 45, November, Sage]

In the Germany of the 1930s, a demonic idea was born in a demented brain; the word went forth; orders were given, repeated, widely broadcast; and men, women, and children were herded into death camps. Their offshore signals, cries for help, did not summon us to rescue. We had become inured to the reality of human suffering. We could no longer hear what the words meant or did not credit them or not enough of us joined the chorus. Shrieking victims perished in the cold blankness of inhumane silence.

We were deaf to the apocalyptic urgency in Solzhenitsyn's declaration from the Gulag that we must check the disastrous course of history. We were heedless of the lesson of his experience that only the unbending strength of the human spirit, fully taking its stand on the shifting frontier of encroaching violence and declaring "not one step further," though death may be the end of it—only this unwavering firmness offers any genuine defense of peace for the individual, of genuine peace for mankind at large.2

In past human crises, writers and thinkers strained language to the breaking point to keep alive the memory of the unimaginable, to keep the human conscience from forgetting. In the current context, however, intellectuals seem more devoted to abstract assaults on values than to thoughtful probing of the moral dimensions of human experience.

"Heirs of the ancient possessions of higher knowledge and literacy skills,"3 we seem to have lost our nerve, and not only because of Holocaust history and its tragic aftermath. We feel insecure before the empirical absolutes of hard science. We are intimidated by the "high modernist rage against mimesis and content,"\* monstrous progeny of the union between Nietzsche and philosophical formalism, the grim proposal we have bought into that there is no truth, no objectivity, and no disinterested knowledge.5

Less certain about the power of language, that "oldest flame of the humanist soul,"6 to frame a credo to live by or criteria to judge by, we are vulnerable even to the discredited Paul de Man's indecent hint that "wars and revolutions are not empirical events . . . but 'texts' masquerading as facts."7 Truth and reality seem more elusive than they ever were in the past; values are pronounced to be mere fictions of ruling elites to retain power. We are embarrassed by virtue.

Words collide and crack under these new skeptical strains, dissolving into banalities the colossal enormity of what must be expressed lest we forget. Remembering for the future has become doubly dispiriting by our having to remember for the present, too, our having to register and confront what is wrong here and now.

The reality to be fixed in memory shifts as we seek words for it; the memory we set down is flawed by our subjectivities. It is selective, deceptive, partial, unreliable, and amoral. It plays tricks and can be invented. It stops up its ears to shut out what it does not dare to face.8

Lodged in our brains, such axioms, certified by science and statistics, tempt us to concede the final irrelevance of words and memory. We have to get on with our lives. Besides, memories reconstructed in words, even when they are documented by evidence, have not often changed the world or fended off the powerful seductions to silence, forgetting, or denying.

Especially denying, which, in the case of the Holocaust, has become an obscene industry competing in the open market of ideas for control of our sense of the past. It is said that the Holocaust never happened. Revisionist history with a vengeance is purveyed in words; something in words must be set against it. Yet what? How do we nerve to the task when we are increasingly disposed to cast both words and memory in a condition of cryogenic dubiety?

Not only before but also since 1945, the criminality of governments, paraded as politics and fattening on linguistic manipulation and deliberately reimplanted memory of past real or imagined grievance, has spread calamity across the planet. The cancer that has eaten at the entrails of Yugoslavia since Tito's death [hasj Kosovo for its locus," but not merely as a piece of land. The country's rogue adventurers use the word "Kosovo" to reinvokc as sacred the land where Serbs were defeated by Turks in 1389!9 Memory of bloody massacres in 1389, sloganized and distorted in 1989, demands the bloody revenge of new massacres and returns civilization not to its past glory but to its gory tribal wars. As Matija Beckovic, the bard of Serb nationalism, writes, "It is as if the Serbian people waged only one battle—by widening the Kosovo charnel-house, by adding wailing upon wailing, by counting new martyrs to the martyrs of Kosovo.... Kosovo is the Serbian-ized history of the Flood—the Serbian New Testament."10

A cover of Siiddeutsche Zeitung in 1994 was printed with blood donated by refugee women from Bosnia in an eerily perverse afterbirth of violence revisited."We stand benumbed before multiplying horrors. As Vaclav Havel warned more than a decade ago, regimes that generate them "are the avant garde of a global crisis in civilization." The depersonalization of power in "system, ideology and appa-rat," pathological suspicions about human motives and meanings, the loosening of individual responsibility, the swiftness by which disastrous events follow one upon another "have deprived us of our conscience, of our common sense and natural speech and thereby, of our actual humanity."12 Nothing less than the transformation of human consciousness is likely to rescue us.

#### Defer negative on morality arguments – anthropocentrism independently preserves environmental responsibility and intervening actors prevent a gradual slide into extinction

**Hwang, ‘3**. Kyung-sig, Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Seoul National University. “Apology for Environmental Anthropocentrism,” Asian Bioethics in the 21st Century, http://eubios.info/ABC4/abc4304.htm.

The third view, which will be defended here, is that there is no need for a specifically ecological ethic to explain our obligations toward nature, that our moral rights and duties **can satisfactorily be explained in terms of traditional, human-centered ethical theory**.[4] In terms of this view, ecology bears on ethics and morality in that it brings out the far-reaching, extremely important effects of man's actions, that much that seemed simply to happen-extinction of species, depletion of resources, pollution, over rapid growth of population, undesirable, harmful, dangerous, and damaging uses of technology and science - is due to human actions that are controllable, preventable, by men and hence such that men can be held accountable for what occurs. Ecology brings out that, often acting from the best motives, however, simply from short-sighted self-interest without regard for others living today and for those yet to be born, brings about very damaging and often irreversible changes in the environment, changes such as the extinction of plant and animal species, destruction of wilderness and valuable natural phenomena such as forests, lakes, rivers, seas. Many reproduce at a rate with which their environment cannot cope, so that damage is done, to and at the same time, those who are born are ill-fed, ill-clad, ill-sheltered, ill-educated. Moralists concerned with the environment have pressed the need for a basic rethinking of the nature of our moral obligations in the light of the knowledge provided by ecology on the basis of personal, social, and species prudence, as well as on general moral grounds in terms of hitherto unrecognized and neglected duties in respect of other people, people now living and persons yet to be born, those of the third world, and those of future generation, and also in respect of preservation of natural species, wilderness, and valuable natural phenomena. Hence we find ecological moralists who adopt this third approach, writing to the effect that concern for our duties entail concern for our environment and the ecosystems it contains. Environmental ethics is concerned with the moral relation that holds between humans and the natural world, the ethical principles governing those relations determine our duties, obligations, and responsibilities with regard to the earth's natural environment and all the animals and plants inhabit it. A **human-centered theory of environmental ethics** holds that our moral duties with respect to the natural world are all **ultimately derived from the duties we owe to one another as human beings**. It is because we should respect the human rights, or should protect and promote the well being of humans, that we must place certain constraints on our treatment of the earth's environment and its non-human habitants.[5]

# 2NC

#### Argumentative exclusion is inevitable, but the implicit exclusion resulting from their framework is on balance worse than the explicit exclusion of the dialectic model – reinscribes social hegemonies

**Tonn**, 200**5** (Mari Boor Tonn, Associate Professor of Communication at the University of Maryland, “Taking Conversation, Dialogue, and Therapy Public,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs, 8(3), Project Muse

Among academics, **this cult of conversation has been championed** most ardently **by communitarian political theorists**, civic journalists, cultural feminists, **postmodernists**, multiculturalists, family therapists, **and a number of communication scholars concerned with identity**, the public sphere, conflict and negotiation, and counseling. In many cases, the rationale for a conversational [End Page 405] turn in the ways citizens conduct business, solve problems, and approach conflict is couched in a language interpolating "conversation" or "dialogue" with spirituality and therapy. Particularly visible is Deborah Tannen's 1998 bestseller The Argument Culture: Moving from Debate to Dialogue, wherein she blames a culture of critique for "corroding our spirit."[2](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html" \l "FOOT2) Likewise, the earlier The Conversation of Journalism proposed supplanting the "disabling" monological approach to news reporting with a more inclusive dialogic paradigm overtly engaging citizens.[3](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html" \l "FOOT3) So, too, at the University of New Hampshire in the late 1990s, administrators and some faculty proposed replacing the existing Academic Senate, which they termed "dysfunctional," with a nonvoting University Forum aimed to "advance functional conversation" and attendant community.[4](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html" \l "FOOT4) And the conflation of the conversational and therapeutic for approaching public controversies is made explicit in the Boston Public Conversations Project, premised on "[t]he idea that family therapy skills can be fruitfully applied in the realm of 'public conversations'" on "divisive public issues" such as abortion.[5](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html" \l "FOOT5) Perhaps the most conspicuous effort at replacing public debate with therapeutic dialogue was President Clinton's Conversation on Race, launched in mid-1997. Controversial from its inception for its ideological bent, the initiative met further widespread criticism for its encounter-group approaches to racial stratification and strife, critiques echoing previously articulated concerns—my own among them[6](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html" \l "FOOT6) —that certain dangers lurk in employing private or social communication modes for public problem-solving.[7](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html" \l "FOOT7) Since then, **others have joined in contesting the treating of public problems with narrative and psychological approaches, which**—in the name of promoting civility, cooperation, personal empowerment, and socially constructed or idiosyncratic truths—**actually work to contain dissent, locate systemic social problems solely within individual neurosis, and otherwise fortify hegemony**.[8](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html" \l "FOOT8) Particularly noteworthy is Michael Schudson's challenge to the utopian equating of "conversation" with the "soul of democracy." Schudson points to pivotal differences in the goals and architecture of conversational and democratic deliberative processes. To him, political (or democratic) conversation is a contradiction in terms. **Political deliberation entails a clear instrumental purpose**, ideally remaining ever mindful of its implications beyond an individual case. **Marked by disagreement**—even pain—**democratic deliberation contains transparent prescribed procedures governing participation and decision making so as to protect the timid or otherwise weak**. In such processes, written records chronicle the interactional journey toward resolution, and in the case of writing law especially, provide accessible justification for decisions rendered. In sharp contrast, conversation is often "small talk" exchanged among family, friends, or candidates for intimacy, unbridled by set agendas, and prone to egocentric rather than altruistic goals. Subject only to unstated [End Page 406] "rules" such as turn-taking and politeness, conversation tends to advantage the gregarious or articulate over the shy or slight of tongue.[9](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html" \l "FOOT9) The events of 9/11, the onset of war with Afghanistan and Iraq, and the subsequent failure to locate Iraqi weapons of mass destruction have resuscitated some faith in debate, argument, warrant, and facts as crucial to the public sphere. Still, the romance with public conversation persists. As examples among communication scholars, Karlyn Kohrs Campbell's 2001 Carroll C. Arnold Distinguished Lecture treated what she termed "the rhetoric of conversation" as a means to "manage controversy" and empower non-dominant voices[10](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html" \l "FOOT10) ; multiple essays in a 2002 special issue of Rhetoric & Public Affairs on deliberative democracy couch a deliberative democratic ideal in dialogic terms[11](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html" \l "FOOT11) ; and the 2005 Southern States Communication Convention featured family therapist Sallyann Roth, founding member and trainer of the Public Conversations Project, as keynote speaker.[12](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html" \l "FOOT12) Representative of the dialogic turn in deliberative democracy scholarship is Gerard A. Hauser and Chantal Benoit-Barne's critique of the traditional procedural, reasoning model of public problem solving: "A deliberative model of democracy . . . constru[es] democracy in terms of participation in the ongoing conversation about how we shall act and interact—our political relations" and "Civil society redirects our attention to the language of social dialogue on which our understanding of political interests and possibility rests."[13](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html" \l "FOOT13) And on the political front, British Prime Minister Tony Blair—facing declining poll numbers and mounting criticism of his indifference to public opinion on issues ranging from the Iraq war to steep tuition hike proposals—launched The Big Conversation on November 28, 2003. Trumpeted as "as way of enriching the Labour Party's policy making process by listening to the British public about their priorities," the initiative includes an interactive government website and community meetings ostensibly designed to solicit citizens' voices on public issues.[14](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html" \l "FOOT14) In their own way, each treatment of public conversation positions it as a democratic good, a mode that heals divisions and carves out spaces wherein ordinary voices can be heard. In certain ways, Schudson's initial reluctance to dismiss public conversation echoes my own early reservations, given the ideals of egalitarianism, empowerment, and mutual respect conversational advocates champion. Still, in the spirit of the dialectic ostensibly underlying dialogic premises, this essay argues that various negative consequences can result from transporting conversational and therapeutic paradigms into public problem solving. In what follows, I extend Schudson's critique of a conversational model for democracy in two ways: First, whereas Schudson primarily offers a theoretical analysis, I interrogate public conversation as a praxis in a variety of venues, illustrating how public **"conversation" and "dialogue" have been coopted to silence rather than empower marginalized or dissenting voices**. In practice, public conversation easily can emulate what feminist political scientist Jo Freeman termed "the tyranny of structurelessness" in her classic 1970 critique of consciousness-raising groups in the women's liberation movement,[15](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html" \l "FOOT15) as well as the key traits Irving L. Janis ascribes to "groupthink."[16](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html" \l "FOOT16) Thus, contrary to its promotion as a means to neutralize hierarchy and exclusion in the public sphere, public conversation can and has accomplished the reverse. When such moves are rendered transparent, public conversation and dialogue, I contend, risk increasing rather than diminishing political cynicism and alienation. Second, whereas Schudson focuses largely on ways a conversational model for democracy may mute an individual's voice in crafting a resolution on a given question at a given time, I draw upon insights of Dana L. Cloud and othersto consider ways in which a therapeutic, conversational approach to public problems can stymie productive, collective action in two respects.[17](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html" \l "FOOT17) First, **because conversation has no clearly defined goal, a public conversation may engender inertia as participants become mired in repeated airings of personal experiences without a mechanism to lend such expressions direction and closure**. As Freeman aptly notes, although "[u]nstructured groups may be very effective in getting [people] to talk about their lives[,] they aren't very good for getting things done. Unless their mode of operation changes, groups flounder at the point where people tire of 'just talking.'"[18](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html" \l "FOOT18) Second, **because the therapeutic bent of much public conversation locates social ills and remedies within individuals or dynamics of interpersonal relationships, public conversations and dialogues risk becoming substitutes for policy formation necessary to correct structural dimensions of social problems**. In mimicking the emphasis on the individual in therapy, Cloud warns, the therapeutic rhetoric of "healing, consolation, and adaptation or adjustment" tends to "encourage citizens to perceive political issues, conflicts, and inequities as personal failures subject to personal amelioration."[19](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html" \l "FOOT19) Social Conversation, Therapy, and Public Deliberation The allure of conversation or dialogue to remedy corrosive political alienation and disaffection undoubtedly lies in social talk as a primary site for locating a sense of self, creating and performing social identity, and developing and sustaining relationships.[20](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html" \l "FOOT20) On its face, conversation appears less threatening than traditional modes of public deliberation in several respects. First, conventional conceptions of expertise are significantly refigured in social conversations. In social settings, evidence often consists of lived experiences, hearsay, anecdotes, and personal feelings and opinions rather than, for example, statistics or studied conclusions from authorities. Moreover, because social conversations frequently [End Page 408]engage with the trivial, quotidian, or entertaining, persons with social or cultural knowledge and interpersonal skills—the talent, say, to tell a joke, discuss sports, or narrate travails of childbearing and rearing—may find themselves prized in a conversational arena. Indeed, conversational "expertise" often is equated with the gift for eliciting and validating personal experiences and opinions of others, even in the face of disagreement. Additionally, whereas informal rules of conversation are familiar and accessible to most individuals, formal processes common to public deliberation may intimidate the uninitiated in parliamentary procedure. Although conversations are not without norms, such talk unfolds spontaneously through informal, unstated conventions of politeness linked to turn-taking; topic initiation, acceptance, and refusal; leave-taking; and so forth. Participants who violate conventions by interrupting, monopolizing talk, or even voicing racism or sexism, for example, seldom face the type of reprimand often encountered in formal deliberations. In a related vein, then, the priority placed on forging and maintaining relationships in social conversations privileges avoiding conflict, even when conversational partners violate norms or make outlandish claims. Because the presumption of trust governs, Ronald Wardbaugh notes, "good behavior in conversations is cooperative behavior" and confrontation becomes anathema: challenging or "correcting others . . . directly questions an underlying assumption of conversation—that everybody is telling the truth."[21](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html" \l "FOOT21) If friction threatens or erupts, parties skirt conflict through capitulation or compromise, silence, shifting topics, or polite physical escape.[22](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html" \l "FOOT22) Even some argumentation scholars agree that eluding discord trumps effective decision making when talk is "conversational." Thomas A. Hollihan and Kevin T. Baaske, for example, counsel conversationalists to consider, "How might [a dispute] affect our relationship?" and "What good is securing a victory in an argument, if the person [I] have argued with . . . refuses to be a friend, or comes to . . . dislike [me]?"[23](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html" \l "FOOT23) Therapeutic dialogue is likewise highly personal, although such talk directly engages with some conflict or struggle: addiction, familial strife, grief, eating disorders, low self-esteem, or other personal or relational issues. Therapeutic discourse—be it in encounter groups, 12-step programs, or individual counseling—travels a course of self-discovery aimed ultimately at personal, not social, reform. In therapeutic talk, the self monopolizes; the individual is central subject, provider of evidence, and solution, even if the "problem" entails external structures such as work-related stress or navigating racism, sexism, or homophobia.[24](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html" \l "FOOT24) Ironically, although the postmodern turn in therapy challenges the concept of an isolated self by emphasizing identity and knowledge as products of relational dialogue,[25](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html" \l "FOOT25) some postmodern dialogic therapists nonetheless regard external data that might contradict a client's self-reports [End Page 409] as not germane. Sheila McNamee, for example, terms as "monologic" rather than her preferred "dialogic" the "modernist belief that we can objectively assess a person, a situation, or a relationship based on the notion that there are (or could be) some clear standards for evaluation. . . . .The discourse of reason is so commonplace" that "[w]e simply expect others to be able to provide rational and objective evidence supporting their claims."[26](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html" \l "FOOT26) To be sure, certain conventional boundaries between public and private forms of communication and problem solving are artificial; deliberation over facts, values, and courses of action inhere in essentially all human decision making, whether it be over foreign policy or navigating daily life. So, too, some rhetorical scholars, myself included, have noted that some rhetors may mobilize oppressed or politically disaffected constituencies by transferring certain communication skills acquired in the private sphere into the public domain, especially if the rhetor's aims entail transforming disempowered audiences into confident and skilled political actors.[27](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html" \l "FOOT27) In fact, Campbell's treatment of the "rhetoric of conversation" in the talk of three historical female figures greatly mirrors the consciousness-raising that she earlier analyzed in the women's liberation movement.[28](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html" \l "FOOT28) Still, in important respects, received conceptions of democracy and public deliberation stand in sharp relief to social conversations and therapeutic dialogues. First, unlike the scrupulous avoidance of conflict in social conversations, democratic argument, as Kenneth Burke contends, is necessarily an admixture of "competition" and "cooperation." As he argues, "Only if all reports were in and if there were no vital questions still unanswered, could a social body dispense with the assistance of a vocal opposition in the maturing of our chart as to what is going on, which social functions are helpful and which are harmful."[29](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html" \l "FOOT29) Thus, contrary to the relational harmony privileged in social conversations, true civic deliberation fully recognizes, in Schudson's words, that "Democracy is deeply uncomfortable."[30](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html" \l "FOOT30) Public arguments are catalyzed by predicament or dispute, placing them at odds with the social convention prescribing divisive issues such as politics and religion as off-limits in "polite conversation." Rather than developing relationships of equality, the conversational privileging of affective criteria over reasonable problem solving in public deliberations can invite, as I have said, what Janis terms "groupthink." Among the primary contributors to groupthink, explains Janis, is the goal of group cohesiveness. To maintain the god-term of "community," self-appointed group mindguards paint dissenters as disloyal or uncooperative, limit future membership to like-minded individuals, and frame out-group opposition as too evil, ignorant, or unintelligent to warrant consideration. Similar to social conversations, in groupthink, parties concerned about appearing unduly [End Page 410] quarrelsome avoid conflict by denying or diluting their reservations about a proposed action, shifting or tabling discussion of thorny topics, or resorting to silence or physical absence. Such self-censorship, coupled with the faulty assumption that silence equals consent, results in the illusion of unanimity.[31](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html" \l "FOOT31) Although name-calling and ostracism can and do occur in traditional democratic processes, the prioritizing of group harmony and cohesiveness in conversational models grants freer license to scapegoat. Second, **democratic processes and public problem solving necessarily diverge from social conversations by articulating objectives at the outset; adhering to formal rules for participating in, managing, and achieving problem resolution; and documenting outcomes**. Through the scrupulous recording of motions, discussions, amendments, and votes, the dynamics of such joint action are rendered visible, accessible, and retrievable, even to persons not party to the immediate deliberative process. "Democracies," Schudson writes, "put great store in the power of writing to secure, verify, and make public. Democracies require public memories."[32](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html" \l "FOOT32) Thus, **contrary to the framing of conversation and dialogue as egalitarian public problem-solving models, they, in truth, can reify pecking orders by licensing group members with social authority to set agendas, steer and dominate discussion**, and—absent the polling and recording of votes—interpret the "will" of the group. Moreover, **such informal processes can reward those who speak the loudest, the longest, are the most articulate, or even the most recalcitrant**. Freeman's analysis of consciousness-raising groups is instructive: At any small group meeting anyone with a sharp eye and an acute ear can tell who is influencing whom. The members of the friendship group will relate more to each other than to other people. They listen more attentively, and interrupt less; they repeat each other's points and tend to give in amiably; they tend to ignore or grapple with the "outs" whose approval is not necessary for making a decision . . . They are nuances of interaction, not prewritten scripts. But they are discernible, and they do have their effect. Once one knows . . . whose approval is the stamp of acceptance, one knows who is running things.[33](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html" \l "FOOT33) As a result, Freeman argues that **purportedly "structureless" organizations are a "deceptive . . . smokescreen,"** given that **"'structurelessness' does not prevent the formation of informal structures, but only formal ones** . . . **For everyone to have the opportunity to be involved . . . and to participate . . . the structure must be explicit, not implicit. The rules of decision-making must be open and available to everyone, and this can only happen if they are formalized**."[34](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html" \l "FOOT34) Schudson likewise argues that the inherently "threatening" nature of political deliberation demands procedures guaranteeing "equal access to the floor, equal participation in setting the ground rules for discussion, and a set of ground rules designed to encourage pertinent speaking, attentive listening, appropriate simplifications, and widely apportioned speaking rights."[35](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html" \l "FOOT35) Third, whereas in social and therapeutic talk, personal experience, opinion, and individual well-being reign supreme, the force of "opinion" in a democracy demands allegiance both to reasonableness and to the larger collective good. Unlike certain postmodern dialogic therapists, responsible public deliberators view neither facts as inescapably elusive nor appeals to the rational uniformly suspect. Rather, democratic arguers apply rigorous standards for evidence and, above all, writes Schudson, subscribe to "norms of reasonableness."[36](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html" \l "FOOT36) A key groupthink feature—uncritical, self-righteous faith in the group's inherent morality and traditions—is nourished by privileging lived experiences and personal opinions, the primary content of social and therapeutic talk. As Donal Carbaugh points out, **because the "self" becomes the "locus of conversational life," conversationalists may "disprefer consensual truths, or standards of and for public judgment," which they view to "unduly constrain 'self.'**"[37](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html" \l "FOOT37) **Such an egocentric focus can enable members of deliberative bodies to discount crucial, formal types of external evidence that counters existing personal and group assumptions**,

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resulting in what Lisa M. Gring-Pemble characterizes as forming public policies such as welfare reform "by anecdote."[38](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html" \l "FOOT38) Fourth, **a communicative model that views public issues through a relational, personal, or therapeutic lens nourishes hegemony by inviting political inaction. Whereas the objective of conventional public argument is achieving an instrumental goal such as a verdict or legislation, the aim of social conversation generally stops with self-expression**. As Schudson puts it, "Conversation has no end outside itself."[39](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html" \l "FOOT39) Similarly, modeling therapeutic **paradigms that trumpet "talking cures" can discourage a search for political solutions to public problems by casting cathartic talk as sufficient remedy**. As Campbell's analysis of consciousness-raising groups in the women's liberation movement points out, "**[S]olutions must be structural, not merely personal, and analysis must move beyond personal experience and feeling . . . Unless such transcendence occurs, there is no persuasive campaign . . . [but] only the very limited realm of** therapeutic, **small group interaction**."[40](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html" \l "FOOT40) Finally, and related, a therapeutic framing of social problems threatens to locate the source and solution to such ills solely within the individual, the "self-help" on which much therapy rests. **A postmodern therapeutic framing of conflicts as relational misunderstandings occasioned by a lack of dialogue** not only assumes that familiarity inevitably breeds caring (rather than, say, irritation or contempt) but, more importantly, **provides cover for ignoring the structural dimensions of social problems** such as disproportionate black poverty. **If objective reality is unavoidably a fiction**, as Sheila McNamee claims, **all suffering can be dismissed as psychological rather than based in real, material circumstance, enabling defenders of the status quo to admonish citizens to "heal" themselves**. Below, various exemplars of public interactions and decision-making processes couched as "conversations" and "dialogues" expose the promotion of these private communication models as balm for the inequities, discord, and inertia of civic life as often more romantic than realistic, what Burke might term an "idealistic lie."[41](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html" \l "FOOT41) As importantly, such cases illustrate his contention that ostensible "cures" for social problems often "take on the quality of the disease."[42](http://iiiprxy.library.miami.edu:2117/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v008/8.3tonn.html" \l "FOOT42) Indeed, **rather than remedying exclusion, hierarchy, polarization, and inertia in civic life, the appropriation of conversation and dialogue into the public realm can foster and sustain such problems**.

# 1NR

### --util

#### Biology proves—utilitarian focus on survival is the only accurate framework

NYT 7 (3/20, Scientist Finds the Beginnings of Morality in Primate Behavior, http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F20611FE3C540C738EDDAA0894DF404482, AG)

Some animals are surprisingly sensitive to the plight of others. Chimpanzees, who cannot swim, have drowned in zoo moats trying to save others. Given the chance to get food by pulling a chain that would also deliver an electric shock to a companion, rhesus monkeys will starve themselves for several days. Biologists argue that these and other social behaviors are the precursors of human morality. They further believe that if morality grew out of behavioral rules shaped by evolution, it is for biologists, not philosophers or theologians, to say what these rules are. Moral philosophers do not take very seriously the biologists’ bid to annex their subject, but they find much of interest in what the biologists say and have started an academic conversation with them. The original call to battle was sounded by the biologist Edward O. Wilson more than 30 years ago, when he suggested in his 1975 book “Sociobiology” that “the time has come for ethics to be removed temporarily from the hands of the philosophers and biologicized.” He may have jumped the gun about the time having come, but in the intervening decades biologists have made considerable progress. Last year Marc Hauser, an evolutionary biologist at Harvard, proposed in his book “Moral Minds” that the brain has a genetically shaped mechanism for acquiring moral rules, a universal moral grammar similar to the neural machinery for learning language. In another recent book, “Primates and Philosophers,” the primatologist Frans de Waal defends against philosopher critics his view that the roots of morality can be seen in the social behavior of monkeys and apes. Dr. de Waal, who is director of the Living Links Center at Emory University, argues that all social animals have had to constrain or alter their behavior in various ways for group living to be worthwhile. These constraints, evident in monkeys and even more so in chimpanzees, are part of human inheritance, too, and in his view form the set of behaviors from which human morality has been shaped. Many philosophers find it hard to think of animals as moral beings, and indeed Dr. de Waal does not contend that even chimpanzees possess morality. But he argues that human morality would be impossible without certain emotional building blocks that are clearly at work in chimp and monkey societies. Dr. de Waal’s views are based on years of observing nonhuman primates, starting with work on aggression in the 1960s. He noticed then that after fights between two combatants, other chimpanzees would console the loser. But he was waylaid in battles with psychologists over imputing emotional states to animals, and it took him 20 years to come back to the subject. He found that consolation was universal among the great apes but generally absent from monkeys — among macaques, mothers will not even reassure an injured infant. To console another, Dr. de Waal argues, requires empathy and a level of self-awareness that only apes and humans seem to possess. And consideration of empathy quickly led him to explore the conditions for morality. Though human morality may end in notions of rights and justice and fine ethical distinctions, it begins, Dr. de Waal says, in concern for others and the understanding of social rules as to how they should be treated. At this lower level, primatologists have shown, there is what they consider to be a sizable overlap between the behavior of people and other social primates. Social living requires empathy, which is especially evident in chimpanzees, as well as ways of bringing internal hostilities to an end. Every species of ape and monkey has its own protocol for reconciliation after fights, Dr. de Waal has found. If two males fail to make up, female chimpanzees will often bring the rivals together, as if sensing that discord makes their community worse off and more vulnerable to attack by neighbors. Or they will head off a fight by taking stones out of the males’ hands. Dr. de Waal believes that these actions are undertaken for the greater good of the community, as distinct from person-to-person relationships, and are a significant precursor of morality in human societies. [Continues] “Morality is as firmly grounded in neurobiology as anything else we do or are,” Dr. de Waal wrote in his 1996 book “Good Natured.” Biologists ignored this possibility for many years, believing that because natural selection was cruel and pitiless it could only produce people with the same qualities. But this is a fallacy, in Dr. de Waal’s view. Natural selection favors organisms that survive and reproduce, by whatever means. And it has provided people, he writes in “Primates and Philosophers,” with “a compass for life’s choices

#### No intrinsic morality—values can’t be given meaning without consequential analysis of actions justified under the ethical framework

**Minteer 4** – Prof Environmental Ethics and Policy, Arizona State (Ben, Environmental Ethics Beyond Principle?, Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 17.4, p 139-40, AG)

As a result, the “rightness” of moral claims depends on their ability to contribute to the resolution of specific problematic situations – an ability determined through intelligent appraisal and inquiry – not on the intrinsic nature of the principle itself (Dewey, 1989, p. 280). In making this move, Dewey significantly shifted discussions of moral theory and argument away from a preoccupation with the ontological status and justification of general moral principles and moved it toward the refinement of the process of intelligent inquiry and the development of better and more effective methods of deliberation, cooperative problem solving, and conflict resolution. It is important to note that in arguing for the instrumental and experimental role of moral principles in problematic situations, Dewey did not deny the existence of such principles, nor did he reject their role within moral deliberation and decision-making. He only sought to put them in their proper place. Historically successful moral principles promoting the good and the right were not to be uncritically accepted before experimental inquiry, just as they were not to be cast aside simply because they trafficked in generalities or presumed to hold a universal currency. Instead, they should be understood as potentially useful resources for comprehending and ultimately transforming particular unstable and disrupted moral contexts: In moral matters there is . . . a presumption in favor of principles that have had a long career in the past and that have been endorsed by men of insight. . . . Such principles are no more to be lightly discarded than are scientific principles worked out in the past. But in one as in the other, newly discovered facts or newly instituted conditions may give rise to doubts and indicate the inapplicability of accepted doctrines (Dewey, 1989, p. 330). Still, in Dewey’s way of thinking, the conceptual and practical demands placed on previously held moral principles by the emergence of new experiences and evolving factual circumstances required an adaptive moral system, one in which standards, rules, and principles would necessarily undergo various degrees of revision and reinterpretation in order to meet new socio-historical conditions and changing individual desires. Often, this process led to the formulation of entirely new principles as moral inquirers responded to the dynamic and evolving quality of human experience: In fact, situations into which change and the unexpected enter are a challenge to intelligence to create new principles. Morals must be a growing science if it is to be a science at all, not merely because all truth has not yet been appropriated by the mind of man, but because life is a moving affair in which old moral truth ceases to apply.

#### Survival focus inevitable, doesn’t lead to tyranny, and a precondition to being able to change all other human values

**Callahan 73** (Daniel, The Tyranny of Survival, p 90-1, AG)

Moreover, I would want to argue that, in order to remain human, they should not be all that responsive. Or better, they should be responsive only to those survival arguments which manage to integrate the need for survival with a whole range of other human needs, some of which would risk survival for the achievement of higher values. A beginning can be made toward this integration by noting some of the uses and abuses of the concept of survival. Historically, the uses have been more evident than the abuses. Among the uses are those of a fundamental perception of a biological reality principle: **unless one exists, everything else is in vain**. That is why survival, the desire to live, is so potent a force, and why the right to life is such a basic part of any reasonably enlightened social, political and legal system. Politically, particularly in time of war, national survival has been a potent force for mobilization of community effort, transcendence of self-interest, and creation of patriotic spirit. For individuals, the desire to ensure the survival of offspring has been the source of great and selfless sacrifice and the voluntary acceptance of obligation to future generations. Within the private self, a will to live, to survival at all costs has literally kept people alive, starving off a despair which would otherwise have been totally destructive. That individuals, tribes, communities and nations have committed so much will, energy and intelligence to survival has meant that they have survived, and their descendants are present to tell the tale. Nothing is so powerful a motive force, for self or society, as the threat of annihilation, nothing so energizing as the necessity to live. Without life, all else is in vain. Leaving aside the question of whether we need more enlightened attitudes toward suicide in our society, which we may, it is still not for nothing that suicide has been looked upon with abhorrence, whether from a religious or a psychological perspective. It seems to violate the most fundamental of human drives, and has always required a special explanation or justification.

### --ontology

#### Don’t prefer any ontology --- accept all because there is no warrant to prefer one over another.

Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, 2010. Associate Professor of International Relations in the School of International Service at the American University in Washington, DC. “The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and its Implications for the Study of World Politics,” p 27-8.

However, I do not think that putting ontology first in the panacea that many seem to think it is. For one thing, if one puts ontology first then one is, at least provisionally, committed to a particular (if revisable) account of what the world is made up of: co-constituted agents and structures, states interacting under conditions of anarchy, global class relations, or what have you. **This is a rather large leap to make on anyone’s authority**, let alone that of a philosopher of science. Along these lines, **it is unclear what if any *warrant* we could provide for most ontological claims if ontology in this sense were to always “come first**.” If someone makes an ontological claim about something existing in the world, then we are faced with an intriguing epistemological problem of how possibly to know whether that claim is true, and the equally intriguing problem of selecting the proper methods to use in evaluating that claim (Chernoff 2009b, 391). But if epistemology and method are supposed to be fitted to ontology, then we are stuck with techniques and standards designed to respond to the specificity of the object under investigation. This problem is roughly akin to using state-centric measurements of cross-border transactions to determine whether globalization is eroding state borders, because the very object under investigation—“state borders”—is presupposed by the procedures of data collection, meaning that the answer will always, and necessarily, assert the persistence of the state.

#### Ontology stifles politics and creates a direct tradeoff with pragmatic action

Wolin, 92 [Richard, Distinguished Professor of History and Political Science at the City University of New York Graduate Center, The Politics of Being, p116]

Another major dilemma for Heidegger's theory of politics is the way in which the activities of the state are rigidly subordinated to the realization of philosophical ends. In Heidegger's schema, political life is in essence stripped of all intrinsic content: such content fades into insignificance in face of the more exalted philosophical mission with which the state is entrusted, that is, the role it is to play in the encounter between Being and beings, in the setting to work of truth. Absent from this theory is any reference to the various activities of politics that account for its specifically political nature: voting, speeches, popular assemblies, public debate. All such considerations shrink to matters of supreme indifference given Heidegger's distaste for democracy in general, and modern democracy in particular.

Moreover, as Harries indicates, Heidegger's theory of the state as a "work" is modeled upon his theory of the work of art. Thus, as we have seen, in Heidegger's view, both works of art and the state are examples of the "setting-to-work of truth." In essence, the state becomes a giant work of art: like the work of art, it participates in the revelation of truth, yet on a much more grandiose and fundamental scale, since it is the Gesamtkunstwerk within which all the other sub-works enact their preassigned roles. However, the idea of basing political judgments on analogy with aesthetic judgments is an extremely tenuous proposition. Though we may readily accept and even welcome Heidegger's claim that works of art reveal the truth or essence of beings ("The work [of art] . . . is not the reproduction of some particular entity that happens to be present at any given time," observes Heidegger; "it is, on the contrary, the reproduction of the thing's general essence")," we must question the attempt to transpose aesthetico-metaphysical criteria to the realm of political life proper. Is it in point of fact meaningful to speak of the "unveiling of truth" as the raison d'etre of politics in the same way one can say this of a work of art or a philosophical work? Is not politics rather a nonmetaphysical sphere of human interaction, in which the content of collective human projects, institutions, and laws is articulated, discussed, and agreed upon? Is it not, moreover, in some sense dangerous to expect metaphysical results from politics? For is not politics instead a sphere of human plurality, difference, and multiplicity; hence, a realm in which the more exacting criteria of philosophical truth must play a subordinate role? And thus, would it not in fact be to place a type of totalitarian constraint on politics to expect it to deliver over truth in such pristine and unambiguous fashion? And even if Heidegger's own conception of truth (which we shall tum to shortly) is sufficiently tolerant and pluralistic to allay such fears, shouldn't the main category of political life be justice instead of truth? Undoubtedly, Heidegger's long-standing prejudices against "value-philos- ophy" prevented him from seriously entertaining this proposition; and thus, as a category of political judgment, justice would not stand in sufficiently close proximity to Being. In all of the aforementioned instances, we see that Heidegger's political philosophy is overburdened with ontological considerations that end up stifling the inner logic of politics as an independent sphere of human action.

#### Kills politics

Ciaramelli, 07 [Fabio Ciaramelli, Professor of Philosophy at Federico fl University in Naples, 2007, “Ontological Difference and the Question of Politics A Dialogue between Fabio Ciaramelli and David Webb,” European Journal of Political Theory, 6.1]

We can say first of all that we are not determined by Being in its simplicity. No restriction is placed on who I am or what I can be; the unity or simplicity in question here is ontological, not political or normative in any usual sense. Being does not stand above our existence, somehow making us what we are. Conversely, we cannot ourselves determine the unity or simplicity, as though it were a thing like other things in this world. Heidegger’s thought thus initiates a break with **the whole structure of thought** that we have inherited from Kant, including the legacy of positivism and the human sciences. In this way, two broad paths that have been followed in modernity **are now closed**: first, the determination of the conditions of existence as transcendental; second, the determination of positive conditions such as those addressed by political economy and the human sciences. Both of these approaches are shown by Heidegger to be insufficiently fundamental and thereby to lead to dead ends if followed in isolation. The simplicity in question here is not that of a fixed form, but of an unfolding event; it is the simplicity of historicity, of our historicity. Here, thinking confronts a different challenge; to recover a unity from the variety of all things and all existence, without exclusion; to discern a simplicity that is continually confronted by our historical existence. To recognize this challenge is to be responsive to the question of Being posed in the ontological difference. FC: I’m happy to accept your correction of the way I presented the ontological difference. It is precisely because Being is not a being, that ontological simplicity, irreducible to ontic multiplicity, is not analogous to the simplicity of things in the world, as what I said may have implied. But while this important correction distinguishes Heideggerian ontology from traditional metaphysics, it does not prevent them from converging at a decisive point; that is, in discrediting human activity in general, **and politics in particular**, which remains **subordinate to theory (in the form of the thinking of Being).** In short, in my view, however clear it may be that Heidegger does not fail to recognize that the ontological dimension is inseparable from the multiplicity and contingency of beings, and however much this dimension is accessible from our concrete existence, what remains essential here is that the ontological dimension is characterized by a simplicity to which we too belong in the deepest reaches of ourselves, and in which alone fullness shelters. Only the thinking of Being is equal to this situation in which human being irremediably finds itself: thrown amidst ontic multiplicity, but addressed by an ontological call. And it is to this call that ‘authentic praxis’ – that is, the ontological attitude – is uniquely able to respond. Thus, the fundamental inquiry into Being and its meaning, which is what Heidegger’s thought essentially comes down to, has a clear impact on human activity. Far from meeting a recognition of its centrality, its autonomy and even its tragic quality, human activity finds itself **definitively subordinated to the event of Being**. This, as you say, does not have the simplicity of rigid and static forms. Yet it is precisely towards the simplicity of this event that is unfolding, and radiating its inner and originary meaning, that human activity must orient itself. The fact that there may be an originary meaning of Being, accessible in its simplicity to an essential thinking that transcends ontic complications, **excludes the space of politics**, if by this we understand the self-determination of the collective praxis in the public space of the polis. In fact, the decision to take up a form of life capable of corresponding to the call of Being is Entschlossenheit, the **solitary resoluteness** of Dasein that is central to Being and Time, but also to the texts that follow the so-called turn (Kehre) in Heidegger’s work. To take just one example, in the second part of ‘On the Essence of Truth’ the centrality of Entschlossenheit is confirmed, and the **elitist and aristocratic** character of the appeal to being to which it alone offers access is made very clear: ‘How many have ears for these words matters not. Who those are that can hear them determines the human being’s standpoint in history.’3 Even when Heidegger speaks of the necessary ‘establishing’ (Einrichtung) of truth, given that this is not an ontic idea, not something that exists first ‘somewhere among the stars’ as present-to-hand (Vorhanden) and is then translated into a being; even when he says that politics, understood as ‘the act that founds a political state’, is one of the essential ways ‘in which truth establishes itself’ in beings; **even then, the premise of political activity in a strong sense is missing**.4 This can be conceived as the self-determination of human action, insofar as it does not have to articulate, carry out or put into practice an originary meaning that precedes it and which it interpellates. Yet in my view it is precisely this that Heidegger continually presupposes. In other words, the event of Being, from his standpoint, is the historicization – that is, the occurrence – of an original and accomplished meaning to which only essential thinking is able to correspond in an interrogatory manner. What emerges as decisive here is less the way that man responds to the call than the way that the call itself occurs, simple and full of meaning. What is decisive is situated on a plane that is ontologically far more profound than the ontic surface of human activities. It is not by chance that, in his usual oracular tone, Heidegger peremptorily remarks: ‘The rare and the simple decisions of history arise from the way the original essence of truth essentially unfolds.’5 The thinking of Being – uniquely able to relate to the recondite place of this origin and to grasp it in its simplicity – is also unique in realizing the essence of action, which consists in bringing to fufillment (Vollbringen) what already fully is in its simplicity (according to the well-known incipit of the Letter on Humanism). Such action, considered as equivalent to thinking, **not only has nothing of the collective about it**, but it is **allergic to any form of self-determination**. The only thing that can determine it is the fullness and simplicity of its originary meaning. I see this as confirmation of the central tenet of Heidegger’s discourse on politics, which I do not intend to pursue further, because I think it **is philosophically false and politically dangerous**. What is to my mind most open to argument is the **subordination of politics to ontology**, by virtue of what Heidegger himself, in a lecture course from 1942 (a historically and politically decisive moment), called ‘a primordial relationship’ between polis and Being.6 Immediately prior to this, the text presents the polis as letting ‘the totality of beings come in this or that way into the unconcealedness of its condition’. This surreptitious **reduction of the sociopolitical space to the simplicity of ontology**, in addition to being false and simplistic, **is the very worst form of political deception**: in fact it implicitly suggests that only the ‘few’ who know how to correspond to the self-disclosure of Being and how to live in its environs **are able to sustain the destiny of the polis**.

### --humans good

#### TURN – `anthropocentrism is key to environmental sustainability

David **Schmidtz, 2k.** Philosophy, University of Arizona, Environmental Ethics, p. 379-408

Like economic reasoning, ecological reasoning is reasoning about equilibria and perturbations that keep systems from converging on equilibria. Like economic reasoning, ecological reasoning is reasoning about competition and unintended consequences, and the internal logic of systems, a logic that dictates how a system responds to attempts to manipulate it. Environmental activism and regulation do not automatically improve the environment. It is a truism in ecology, as in economics, that well-intentioned interventions do not necessarily translate into good results. Ecology (human and nonhuman) is complicated, our knowledge is limited, and environmentalists are themselves only human. Intervention that works with the system’s logic rather than against it can have good consequences. Even in a centrally planned economy, the shape taken by the economy mainly is a function not of the central plan but of how people respond to it, and people respond to central plans in ways that best serve their purposes, not the central planner’s. Therefore, even a dictator is in no position simply to decide how things are going to go. Ecologists understand that this same point applies in their own discipline. They understand that an ecology’s internal logic limits the directions in which it can be taken by would-be ecological engineers. Within environmental philosophy, most of us have come around to something like Aldo Leopold’s view of humans as plain citizens of the biotic community.[21] As Bryan Norton notes, the contrast between anthropocentrism and biocentrism obscures the fact that we increasingly need to be nature-centered to be properly human-centered; we need to focus on "saving the ecological systems that are the context of human cultural and economic activities." [22] If we do not tend to what is good for nature, we will not be tending to what is good for people either. As Gary Varner recently put it, on purely anthropocentric grounds we have reason to think biocentrically.[23] I completely agree. What I wish to add is that the converse is also true: on purely biocentric grounds, **we have reason to think anthropocentrically**. We need to be human-centered to be properly nature-centered, for if we do not tend to what is good for people, we will not be tending to what is good for nature either. From a biocentric perspective, preservationists sometimes **are not anthropocentric enough**. They sometimes advocate policies and regulations with no concern for values and priorities that differ from their own. Even from a purely biocentric perspective, such slights are illegitimate. Policy makers who ignore human values and human priorities that differ from their own will, in effect, be committed to mismanaging the ecology of which those ignored values and priorities are an integral part.

#### TURN – species egalitarianism causes mass die-off

Timothy **Luke, ’97**. Poly Sci, Virginia Polytechnic, Ecocritique, pg 26-27.

Deep ecology’s acceptance of otherness in nonhuman life and inanimate entities in the ecosphere is an important contribution. Deep ecologists identify a new normative ethic of personal responsibility in caring for Nature that has basic merit. Yet, as political philosophy, deep ecology has failed thus far to demonstrate how it can be implemented anywhere today. Like many revolutionary programs, deep ecology lacks a theory of the transition. There are no practicable means for changing the everyday life of everyone in the stage of advanced industrialism into an ecotopian community without tremendous costs. Many would agree with Snyder that “we must change the very foundations of our society and our minds. Nothing short of total transformation will do much good.”76 But, how does the United States with 250 million people, living because of the imports and exports of transnational corporate capitalism in and out of huge metroplexes, reinhabit its bioregions such that “the human population lives harmoniously and dynamically by employing a sophisticated and unobtrusive technology in a world environment which is “left nature”? Current world urbanism assumes an obtrusive technology that renders the organic into the inorganic. What happens to Los Angeles, Chicago, New York? Where do these millions go and what will they do? If their corporate agricultural or municipal service supports are cut simply to return the L.A. Basin, Lake Michigan’s South Shores, and Manhattan to Nature, then **Nature does know best how to cope—these immense human populations will** suffer and/or **die**. Deep ecological justice is postdistributional. It defines away distribution systems with human norms of fairness or equality as the apparatus of corrupt technoindustrial society. By calling for biospherical egalitarianism, deep ecology extends the right of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness (as the freedom of self-realization) to nonhuman life and inanimate entities so that humans, for the first time, can truly enjoy their right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness in emancipated Nature. Justice is made into an attribute of all-selves-in-Self working toward their peculiar self-realization. Therefore, humans must alter their hitherto anthropocentric modes of existence, out of the new sense of “fairness” to otherness and other humans growing from ecosophical consciousness, to promote this new biocentric justice.

#### TURN – human-centered social institutions lessen the effects of domination over animal life – this is key to ethical treatment of other organisms

**Linker 5** – Damon, Animal Rights: Contemporary Issues (Compilation), Thompson-Gale, p. 25-26.

It is a curious fact that in virtually all of human history, only in liberal democracies-societies founded on the recognition of the innate dignity of all members of the human race-have animals enjoyed certain minimum protections, codified in our own country in the Animal Welfare Act. It is a no less curious fact that these same liberal democracies have become infected over the past decades with a corrosive self-doubt, giving rise in some educated circles to antiliberal, antiwhite, antimale, anti-Western, and now, with perfect logic, antihuman enthusiasms. The proponents of these various but linked ideologies march under a banner of justice and the promise of extending the blessings of equality to one or more excluded others. Such piety is to be expected in a radical movement seeking well-meaning allies; but it **need not deflect us from the main focus of their aggressive passions,** which the euthanasia-endorsing Peter Singer, for one, has at least had the candor to admit to. Can anyone really doubt that, **were the misanthropic agenda of the animal-rights movement actually to succeed, the result would be an increase in man's inhumanity, to man and animal alike**? In the end, fostering our age-old “prejudice" in favor of human dignity may be the best thing we can do for animals, not to mention for ourselves. <25-26>

### --rhetoric good

#### builds public awareness – and link turns their scholarship args

Matthew 02 (Richard A, associate professor of international relations and environmental political at the University of California at Irvine, Summer, ECSP Report 8:109-124)

In addition, environmental security's language and findings can benefit conservation and sustainable development."' Much environmental security literature emphasizes the importance of development assistance, sustainable livelihoods, fair and reasonable access to environmental goods, and conservation practices as the vital upstream measures that in the long run will contribute to higher levels of human and state security. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) are examples of bodies that have been quick to recognize how the language of environmental security can help them. The scarcity/conflict thesis has alerted these groups to prepare for the possibility of working on environmental rescue projects in regions that are likely to exhibit high levels of related violence and conflict. These groups are also aware that an association with security can expand their acceptance and constituencies in some countries in which the military has political control, For the first time in its history; the contemporary environmental movement can regard military and intelligence agencies as potentialallies in the struggle to contain or reverse humangenerated environmental change. (In many situations, of course, the political history of the military--as well as its environmental record-raise serious concerns about the viability of this cooperation.) Similarly, the language of security has provided a basis for some fruitful discussions between environmental groups and representatives of extractive industries. In many parts of the world, mining and petroleum companies have become embroiled in conflict. These companies have been accused of destroying traditional economies, cultures, and environments; of political corruption; and of using private militaries to advance their interests. They have also been targets of violence, Work is now underway through the environmental security arm of the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) to address these issues with the support of multinational corporations. Third, the general conditions outlined in much environmental security research can help organizations such as USAID, the World Bank, and IUCN identify priority cases--areas in which investments are likely to have the greatest ecological and social returns. For all these reasons, IUCN elected to integrate environmental security into its general plan at the Amman Congress in 2001. Many other environmental groups and development agencies are taking this perspective seriously (e.g. Dabelko, Lonergan& Matthew, 1999). However, for the most part these efforts remain preliminary.' Conclusions Efforts to dismiss environment and security research and policy activities on the grounds that they have been unsuccessful are premature and misguided. This negative criticism has all too often been based on an excessively simplified account of the research findings of Homer-Dixon and a few others. Homer-Dixon’s scarcity-conflict thesis has made important and highly visible contributions to the literature, but it is only a small part of a larger and very compelling theory. This broader theory has roots in antiquity and speaks to the pervasive conflicts and security implications of complex nature-society relationships. The theory places incidents of violence in larger structural and historical contexts while also specifying contemporarily significant clusters of variables. From this more generalized and inclusive perspective, violence and conflict are revealed rarely as a society’s endpoint and far more often as parts of complicated adaptation processes. The contemporary research on this classical problematic has helped to revive elements of security discourse and analysis that were marginalized during the Cold War. It has also made valuable contributions to our understanding of the requirements of human security, the diverse impacts of globalization, and the nature of contemporary transnational security threats. Finall,y environmental security research has been valuable in myriad ways to a range of academics, policymakers, and activists, although the full extent of these contributions remains uncertain, rather than look for reasons to abandon this research and policy agenda, now is the time to recognize and to build on the remarkable achievements of the entire environmental security field.